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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
 
Robert D. Herndon 
 
Master of Science 
 
Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program 
 
December 2015 
 
Title: From Stable to Sustainable: An Integrated Model of Reconciliation in Transitional 
Societies 
 
  
 When looking at societies that are in transition from violence to peace, one of the 
major issues that is present is the need to reconcile with past adversaries. Political 
philosophy points to the need for the creation of a social contract that all groups can reach 
through reasonable agreements.  This represents a political reconciliation between 
groups.  This thesis classifies this idea as the need for cognitive reconciliation.  The field 
of Social Psychology points to how negative emotions, or affect, can inhibit the use of 
reason. The field of Conflict Resolution asserts that there must also be a reconciliation on 
an emotional level as well. This thesis classifies this as the need for affective 
reconciliation. This project looks at a way to integrate the cognitive and affective forms 
of reconciliation into a single model. 
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CHAPTER I 
A NEW MODEL OF RECONCILIATION 
 
 To look back through human history is to look at the struggle that we have faced 
in answering the question of how to live together with people that hold different views of 
the world.  As humanity has moved through the later half of the 20th century and into the 
new millennium, these questions have taken on new meanings as globalization has 
increased the scale of these interactions.  At the heart of the issue, though, still lies the 
types of problems that are related to questions of group identity.  Though differences in 
conceptions of morals and values will inevitably arise in all societies, pluralistic societies 
face a more acute version of this problem.  In many cases, and specifically the ones that I 
will focus on, these issues have manifested into incidents of violence.  The violence has 
lead to greater divisions in these pluralistic societies, making for the perception of 
intractable situations.  These new challenges have naturally lead to questions on the best 
ways in which to solve the issues.   
 The field of political science has been attempting to find answers to the question 
of how to build peaceful societies for centuries.  These discussions have evolved to the 
point where a general acceptance has been reached that the creation of a social contract is 
necessary to build a peaceful society.  The contemporary political thought has focused on 
the way that groups with different conceptions of a good society can reach agreement on 
the creation of social contracts.  Though there are certainly debates between the 
contemporary political theorists, what they all agree upon is that the use of rational 
dialogue is the key for reconciling these sometimes very different conceptions.  Through 
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this project I will show how this literature points towards an idea that I am calling 
cognitive reconciliation.  
However, there is an aspect to humanity that the political theory has left out 
almost completely.  It is this aspect that becomes particularly relevant in the context of 
divided societies.  What is lacking in many divided societies is a minimal level of social 
cohesion.  That is, there is a very limited amount of social connection between the 
members of the different groups.  What political theory argues is that it is the agreements 
between the people that will lead to the building of the social bonds.  What I will 
demonstrate through this project, though, is that if social cohesion is not already present, 
the ability of the people to reach reasonable agreement is unlikely.  What I will also 
demonstrate is that the process of creating stable, peaceful societies takes more than just 
the reconciliation of ideas and concepts.  There must be an attempt to also reconcile the 
social bonds that have also been broken.  This will necessitate a focus on the feelings and 
emotional aspects that social psychology refers to as affect.  
 In this project I have looked specifically at the situations where there are different 
groups that are attempting to share the same land.  For example, Northern Ireland is a 
case that has involved many instances of cognitive attempts at reconciliation. This year 
Northern Ireland is celebrating the 17th anniversary of emerging out of a 30 year cycle of 
violence, euphemistically referred to as “The Troubles”.  When the Peace Agreement was 
signed in Belfast on April 10, 1998, Northern Ireland was a divided society, with a large 
split between the two main cultural identities, Catholic and Protestant.  However, by most 
standards, Northern Ireland is unfortunately more divided socially today than before the 
signing of the Peace Agreement.  Many Catholics and Protestants can go most of their 
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lives without meeting a single member of the other community.  This holds true whether 
living in small towns, or in segregated neighborhoods in the bigger cities.  There are 
entire towns that are made up of a completely Catholic population and likewise towns 
that are completely Protestant.  In the cities entire neighborhoods are separated by what 
are called Peace Walls; structures that were built at the height of the troubles to keep 
violent groups apart.  These walls were constructed to prevent direct violence and their 
continuing existence, it is argued, is necessary to foster stability, and bring about a sense 
of security.  The physical walls separating the communities works to reinforce the 
psychological barriers that have also been established. 
 This was very much a political agreement that helped to shape Northern Ireland 
politics from that point onward until today.  Unfortunately there was no part of the peace 
agreement that called for a Truth and Reconciliation commission, nor has there been 
much support for organizations that are working in communities to.  One such group that 
is doing trauma healing and relationship building is called The Junction.  The Junction 
has been able to bring together members of both the Catholic and Protestant communities 
with the goal of allowing people to share their own personal narratives of the troubles.  
The participants have included ex-paramilitary forces from both sides along with former 
police officers and British military forces, many being in the same room with members of 
the former adversary for the first time.  However, there has been very little affective work 
on any larger scale and  not enough support for programs on the local level.  Most of the 
work that has gone on in Northern Ireland has occurred at what I will demonstrate as the 
cognitive level. 
 In contrast there is the case of Sierra Leone, in which there has been a lot of focus 
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paid to what I will demonstrate as the affective level.  Civil war raged in Sierra Leone for 
over 10 years from 1991 until 2002.  This war started in with the “invasion” of the RUF, 
a militia force under the control of ex-Sierra Leonen Army general Foday Sankoh.  The 
RUF was constituted in the neighboring country of Liberia and was supported by then 
Liberian president Charles Taylor.  The goal of the RUF was to overthrow the newly 
elected government after a new constitution had been agreed to in 1991.  The RUF 
claimed to be a voice of the people after widespread political corruption had all but 
destroyed the Sierra Leonen economy.  However after a series of setbacks, the RUF 
turned to the forced recruitment of child soldiers and begun increasingly brutal guerilla 
type attacks on the civilians of Sierra Leone.  The brutality of these attacks is best 
epitomized by the tactic of removing people's hands.  By using this tactic the RUF sought 
to discourage people from voting.  The RUF used this tactic indiscriminately, ruthlessly 
cutting even the hands and arms off of children.  
 A peace agreement was signed in 1999 between the government and the RUF, and 
new elections were called for as part of the agreement.  The peace agreement did not 
include any provisions on justice for the crimes carried out during the civil war, and the 
RUF was allowed to participate in the elections as a party.  Elections were held in which 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was voted into office.  The peace agreement lasted only a few 
months, when RUF soldiers attempted to take the Capitol of Freetown.  After a series of 
UN interventions from 1999 until 2002, the RUF was defeated and the leadership, 
including Foday Sankoh, was arrested.  This time an international tribunal was 
established that indicted high level leaders in both the RUF and the Army.  A Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was also established and worked in cooperation with the 
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international criminal proceedings.  This TRC differed from the one in South Africa as it 
focused mainly on the types of political reform that would be necessary as well as serving 
as a truth finding body. 
 There has been numerous examples of affective reconciliation in Sierra Leone 
after 2002, including a TRC, as well as robust efforts to restore former RUF soldiers back 
into local communities.  This combined with active criminal proceedings against the 
upper levels of commanders of the RUF, as well as investigations into Generals of the 
Sierra Leone army, has provided for a strong sense of healing and community rebuilding.  
In this, Sierra Leone provides one of the better examples of how affective reconciliation 
can lead to the restoration of communities following high levels of violence.  Former 
child soldiers, whom the survivors have accepted back to society, went through a process 
of public apologies and acts of restitution.  The current government in Sierra Leone 
seems to be stable and did not collapse during the Ebola crisis in 2014.  Sierra Leone 
provides a good example of how affective and cognitive reconciliation can work together 
well.  
 What I want to show through this research is that there needs to be an additional 
layer of theory added to the existing political theories on the creation of stable and 
sustainable pluralistic societies.  This additional level of theory will take into account the 
aspects of emotions and feelings, the affect.   What this project will show is that both the 
cognitive and affective forms of reconciliation are necessary for societies to be able to 
build sustainable peace. By exploring both the political theory, the social psychology 
research, and the practices of conflict resolution, I will show the need for an integrated 
model of reconciliation.  One that takes into account the need for the reconciling of 
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conceptions as well as emotions.   
 This new integrated model of reconciliation will be able to create the conditions 
necessary for the transition from violence to peace.  However, I believe it also needs to be 
mentioned that even this more robust model of reconciliation may not be sufficient in all 
contexts.  This model should not be read as a panacea to all of the issues facing societies 
transitioning away from violence.  What an integrated model of reconciliation does 
provide is a way of creating a more robust society.   A pluralistic society that has 
reconciled both cognitively and affectively would more easily cope with and find 
solutions for the other issues that they may face.  In this sense, an integrated 
reconciliation becomes the mechanism for building a peaceful, pluralistic society. It is not 
the singular answer for all of the questions.  The combination of cognitive and affective 
reconciliation is a necessary component for the building of peaceful societies, and can be 
a platform that supports the other elements of the transition process.   It can be seen as a 
necessary step towards finding a solution to divided societies. 
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CHAPTER II 
COGNITIVE RECONCILIATION: PUBLIC REASON                                           
AND RATIONAL DISCOURSE 
 
“There are long periods in the history of any society during which certain basic questions 
lead to deep and sharp conflict and its difficult if not impossible to find any reasoned 
common ground” - John Rawls 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The foundation of what I am defining as cognitive reconciliation lies in the ideas 
of public reason and rational discourse.  This is the idea that in order to overcome the 
differences that people have on beliefs of morality, values, and conceptions of the good 
can be resolved through the use of reason and rationality.  To better understand these core 
concepts, this chapter will examine the works of several political philosophers.  These 
works describe a foundation for a way in which pluralistic societies, those that contain 
what contemporarily may be called different identities, can function peacefully.  Though 
there are many debates within the discourse, there are a few core concepts that are 
common amongst the different theories.  These core concepts represent the foundation of 
political philosophy, that people are capable of overcoming difference using reason and 
rationality.  What is represented is the general idea that people are capable of building 
pluralistic societies.  These societies are capable of producing, within its citizens, a 
stability necessary for the coexistence of a myriad of differing conceptions.   
 One track of this thinking has produced the idea of a deliberative democracy.  In 
this chapter I am going to explore the two foundational theories that comprise this 
concept.  Also, I will discuss the ways in which author's have described the application of 
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these theories to the real world context of divided societies.  I believe that through this 
exploration I can accurately define what it would mean to have cognitive reconciliation.  
I will also be able to demonstrate how effective it may be in the creation of stable, 
pluralistic societies.  Since this is the stated goal of the author's that I will be focusing on 
for this exploration, I do not believe the context that I am creating for this discussion falls 
outside the realm of political theory.   
 Public reason is a political philosophy concept that pertains to the need of having 
the rules that regulate society to be justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over 
whom those rules purport to have authority. (Quong 2013)  In any society that follows 
these ideals, this authority comes from the ability of these rules to be justified by ideas or 
arguments that all people can, at a certain level, endorse or accept as reasonable.  This 
would make any law or rule that could not be justified on these grounds delegitimate and 
the people living in that society would be under no obligation to follow that law or rule.  
This ideally then goes beyond any sort of undue coercion or force, allowing for people to 
live freely, while also maintaining a sense of commitment to the larger society as a whole.  
The functionality of this relies then on reason itself becoming the unifying force of a 
society, not allowing for any single group or moral doctrine to dominate any other.  
 Virtually all proponents of public reason assume that there is deep and intractable 
disagreement amongst some people, and this disagreement is not simply the result of 
irrationality, prejudice, or self-interest, but rather arises as a result of the normal 
functioning of human reasoning under reasonably favorable conditions. (Quong 2013)  
The goal of public reason then becomes to provide a mechanism that allows for 
discussion between these comprehensive doctrines.  By allowing that differences exist 
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amongst people and that those differences are reasonable, space is then conceivably 
created for a dialogue to occur.   
 In this chapter I am going to be exploring public reason through a progression of 
theorists, roughly from the highest levels of abstraction, digging down to the more 
pragmatic of theories.  The foundations of pluralism have come from primarily two 
sources: John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas.  As Chantal Mouffe states it “what Rawls and 
Habermas are out to do is to build a foundation of how conflicting interests can be 
mediated in a pluralistic society.”  The approach that each of them takes is based on the 
foundations of reason and rationality, though they may define those two in differing ways.   
 John Rawls represents some of the highest level of theoretical abstraction as he 
looks towards the creation of the ideal society based on the conceptions of justice and 
equity that would allow pluralistic society to function over many generations.  At the 
most basic of explanations his theory rests on the idea that people can come to 
agreements on what is just, agreements that all people in the society can view as 
reasonable. The agreements would then become what holds the society together, as the 
conceptions of justice would direct peoples actions in the public sphere of society.  The 
fairly arrived at agreements would carry the authority necessary to govern this public 
sphere because it was agreed to by all.   
 Jurgen Habermas also strives for a highly idealized form of society that uses 
rational and ethical discourse model of engagement between members of a society, 
discourse that could build social cooperation thereby creating a stable foundation for 
pluralism to shape the way that government functions.  For Habermas the solution lies in 
the ability of people to have a strong ethic of discourse that would work to shape the way 
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people interact and to create an impartial moral norm.  This is perhaps more procedural 
that a complete moral impartiality, as Habermas presents it as more a guide to use rather 
a definitive rule.  Habermas, while theoretical, is much more pragmatic in his discussion 
of how societies ideally should function.  His views are mostly based on observations of 
dialogic societies that existed in late 19th century, from which he draws his theory.  Thus 
his theories take on more of a tone of the functionality of his discourse combined with 
theories of how it should best be designed.  
 As we work down to a level of application, we find many writers who have 
worked to explain ways of making theories work in certain contexts.  For the purposes of 
this chapter I am going to be focusing the writings of John Dryzek.  His work is on a 
level that is that applies many of the theories of both Rawls and Habermas to the contexts 
of divided societies.  In his discussion of deliberative democracy, Dryzek paints a picture 
of how deliberation can work to build bridges across these divides.  He focuses on the 
ideal way in which discussions can happen in the public sphere and subsequently shape 
the political discourse.   
 The overall goal of the philosophy associated with deliberative democracy is to 
maintain pluralistic societies that are stable enough to be sustainable for generations.  In 
today's world this is especially important as a majority of the world's conflicts exist 
between different identity and cultural groups that are both inhabiting the same borders.   
The question must be answered as to how to accomplish the task of bringing people who 
now share the conceptual space of a nation state to a place where there can be an agreed 
upon foundation of society. 
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A Rawlsian System of Justice 
 In Justice as Fairness, John Rawls attempts to establish the conditions necessary 
for, what he terms, a well ordered society.  In order to accomplish this goal, Rawls 
constructs an argument for the necessity of Political Justice as the standard for which 
society will find permanent stability.  Rawls believes that the structures of government 
are only just when those structures are agreed upon as reasonable for all, and not 
controlled by what he calls a comprehensive doctrine.  A government controlled by one 
doctrine would lead to the over use of coercive force to make other doctrines to conform 
to the one desired.   For Rawls, this system is unjust and therefore could not be 
sustainable over longer periods of time.  Instead, Rawls conceives of an ideal of 
government that will work towards a cohesive model, one where no single 
comprehensive doctrine will be able to rule.   This would be established by maintaing an 
agreed upon set of fair principles established as the basic structure of government.   In 
this form a society may exist where a plurality of values may be able to coexist.  Rawls 
believes that a political system based upon this idea of justice and political equality is the 
foundation of a pluralist society, even in cases where there is a multitude of competing 
comprehensive doctrines.   In this section I will attempt to explain how Rawls builds his 
argument for this political justice.   
 As I will further show in this section, Rawls believed in a narrow scope for his 
philosophy, choosing to focus only the political structure of society.  Though I have 
stated Rawls as being the most abstract of the three theorists, this does not suggest that 
his ideas are not realistic.  By keeping such a narrow focus on a fair and just structure, it 
is fair to argue that Rawls theory could be achievable.   He believes that reasonable 
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agreements are something that human beings are capable of creating.   As he states, “We 
suppose then that one task of political philosophy.. is to focus on deeply disputed 
questions and to see whether, despite appearances, some underlying basis of 
philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered... Or if such a basis of agreement 
cannot be found, perhaps the divergence of philosophical and moral opinion at the root of 
divisive political differences can at least be narrowed so that social cooperation on a 
footing of mutual respect among citizens can still be maintained.” (Rawls 2001, 2)  It is, 
however, on this last point that I find an assumption upon which Rawls theory rests.  
Rawls believes that a just and fair political system can build social cooperation.  However, 
social cooperation must also be present for there to be an agreement in the first place.  It 
is here that Rawls' theory can become tautological. Through explaining Rawls theory, I 
will show how this is the case.     
 
Original Position  
 For Rawls, the theory of political justice needs a mechanism that will ensure that 
members of a society could chose a form of political justice that would in fact be seen as 
reasonable by all.  This mechanism must exist outside the realm of how normal 
governments tend to be created.  This meant that there could be no competition between 
competing factions for control of the structure of government.  This would ultimately 
lead to an unjust system, one in which would exist an unhealthy, sometimes repressive, 
amount of coercion.  In order to have a basic structure not under the influence of any one 
comprehensive doctrine the basic structure would need to be decided on by in the strictest 
neutrality.  Even if true neutrality were impossible, this mechanism would still need to 
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achieve the closest to neutral as possible.  Rawls introduces this mechanism as the 
original position.   
 The original position would be established as a device of representation.  This 
means that the basic structures of government would be decided upon by people acting as 
trustees, or possibly as direct representatives, on behalf of the different groups within a 
society.  It is essentially a conceptual framework in which these representatives would 
reach an agreement on the most reasonable political structure.  Rawls believed that in 
order to accomplish this task, the representatives would need to find an agreeable 
conception of justice, one that would likely need to fit with the political philosophies of 
the society.  Rawls imagines that this could be like choosing a form of justice from a 
menu of justice choices.  This would not necessarily entail all forms of justice known in 
existence, just the forms conceptualized within appropriate political limits.  Whatever 
form of justice chosen would meet the minimum criterion of being a conception of justice 
that all civilians in the society could reasonably agree with, even if it did not match with 
all morals or values.   
 Rawls then imagines further what the reasons would be for using this mechanism 
and on what foundation it could have.  The goal of the original position would be to find 
a framework for the fair terms of cooperation.  Rawls imagines that this could come 
about three ways: 1) By every representative submitting to higher law than themselves, 
i.e. God's Law 2) By using terms recognized as fair, possibly referring to a moral order of 
values, possibly “natural law” or 3) Terms settled by an agreement reached by fair and 
equal citizens engaged in cooperation, made in view of what they regard as their 
reciprocal advantage.  Of these three, Rawls pushes for the third, reasoning that societies 
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may contain different moral or religious standards, and may also have different moral 
authorities.  The third option also protects against the ability of a comprehensive doctrine 
gaining any leverage.  Option three therefore creates the best opportunity for a political 
structure based upon equal agreement and the highest likelihood that a pluralistic society 
could exist in whatever system is chosen.  Since the decision made in the original 
position would represent an agreement reached by representatives of citizens who are all 
free and equal, then it can be said that basic structure is fair and just.   
 Rawls viewed the original position to be abstract in nature, separating 
representatives from any real identity that they may have.  This abstract notion is 
supported by a concept that Rawls calls the veil of ignorance.  The veil conceptualized 
would act to mask the representatives from knowing who precisely they represent from 
the society, not knowing either their social positions or any particular comprehensive 
doctrines.  The representatives would also not be allowed to know any socialized 
categories like race or ethnic group, sex, or any sort of native endowments such as 
strength or intelligence. (Rawls, 2001) Because of this, the original position could be 
thought of as a thought experiment, a device that would allow for fair agreements to be 
reached.   Any agreement reached would have no necessarily binding principles per se, it 
would only represent agreed upon principles that would be fair and just.  This then would 
serve as the background principles for the foundation of the rest of society.  
  
A Well Ordered Society 
 The overall goal of Rawls entire conception of justice is to create a well ordered 
society.  The argument here is that any society that emerges from the original position 
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would necessarily be well ordered and would be sustainable that way from one 
generation to the next.  This stability is possible due in part to three foundations.  First is 
the knowledge that each citizen has that a conception of justice they find acceptable is 
also acceptable to every other citizen.  This agreed upon conception of political justice is 
then allowed to work cooperatively with the rest of the societal institutions, such as 
religious or cultural groups and institutions.  Lastly, every citizen would be regulated 
according to the recognized principles of justice, allowing all to act justly in whichever 
position in society they attain.  This shared understanding by all would allow for the 
public conception of justice to provide a mutually recognized point of view from which 
citizens can adjudicate their claims of political right on their political institutions or 
against one another. (Rawls, 2001)  
 This well ordered society is created because the basic structure is agreed upon and 
therefore just.  Since the focus of the political justice model is only on this basic structure 
of government, it would not have the capacity to directly dictate the views of any other 
social institutions.  Instead the basic structure would act as a means of indirectly 
informing citizens of ways in which those institutions should fit into this political 
framework.  Therefore the principles of justice for the basic structure of society would be 
viewed as reasonable, while also allowing for private institutions, associations, or cultural 
practices to remain distinct.  Rather citizens may look at the these generalities and decide 
how best to apply these to the basic background understanding of what is just.  In terms 
of theory, Rawls does not set out to endorse any specific conception of justice, he instead 
attempts to only establish a system for determining a reasonable agreement of justice for 
all citizens. 
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 In this sense Rawls system does not set out his theory to be a comprehensive 
doctrine of its own, merely as a political conception, one that can be shaped by each 
society for their own benefit.  It is not a concept that can be applied to all subjects nor one 
that covers all maters.  In this regard, Justice is Fairness is designed to be narrow in scope, 
focusing only on the basic political structures, different than other comprehensive 
doctrines.  In this way, Rawls believes his philosophy should be seen as a realistic idealist 
model.  It gives each society something to strive for while at the same time is based upon 
principles can be achieved.   
    
Overlapping Consensus 
 For Rawls then the idea of a well ordered society rest entirely on the creation of 
what he described as an overlapping consensus.   This is “a consensus in which the same 
political conception is endorsed by the opposing reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
gain a significant body of adherents and endure from one generation to the next.” (Rawls 
2001, 184)  In this way Rawls establishes his theory of justice as one that is based upon a 
political ideal.  This is the ideal of what a society should strive to create in the liberal 
democratic political institutions.  The difficulty in this, and one that Rawls recognizes, is 
the problem of how to get reasonable people to buy into the system.   In this system 
“Citizens have conflicting religious, philosophical and moral views and so they affirm the 
political conception from within different and opposing comprehensive doctrines, and so, 
in part at least, for different reasons.” (Rawls 2001 32)  “Rather we say that in a well-
ordered society the political conception of is affirmed by what we refer to as an 
overlapping consensus.” (Rawls 2001, 32) 
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 In order for a pluralistic society to exist, Rawls argues for a separation of a 
political conception of justice and any other form of comprehensive doctrine, either fully 
or partially held.  Political justice conceived in this way would allow citizens to be able to 
determine in what ways the political concepts related to any of their own comprehensive 
views.  This would prevent any one comprehensive doctrine to dominate the political 
structure.  It also allows for political justice to be endorsed by those who would hold onto 
those comprehensive doctrines. (Rawls 2001) 
 This view is based upon three facts Rawls holds to be true.  The first general fact 
is that “the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines... is a permanent 
feature of the democratic society.  Under the political and social conditions secured by 
the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and 
irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist.” 
(Rawls 2001, 34) Secondly, that oppressive use of state power would be required to 
maintain an adherence to one comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls 2001) Third, that an 
enduring and secure democratic regime, one not so divided by bitter doctrinal disputes 
and hostile social classes, must be willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial 
majority of its politically active citizens. (Rawls 2001) 
 By creating a stand alone political conception of justice, Rawls allows for a 
system that can be agreed to separately, allowing both political justice and 
comprehensive doctrines to exist simultaneously.  In this sense, it is contrasted to “a 
system framed as a workable compromise between known and existing political interests, 
or a system that looks at existing comprehensive doctrines and is tailored to win their 
allegiance.” (Rawls 2001, 188)  The major difference here is between a compromise and 
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a fair agreement.  Though the distinction may seem slight, the difference is quite major.  
A fair agreement for Rawls would be one in which no one feels they have had to give up 
anything important, and thus no compromise.   Rawls sets up his system to be one in 
which political conditions are created to where all citizens can reasonably accept the 
political system.  In this way reasonable comprehensive doctrines can coexist with the 
political conception.  In contrast a political conception that is tailored to fit other social 
comprehensive doctrines would always be a compromised conception, and therefore one 
that not all citizens could accept as just at all times.  This would never allow for a sense 
of political justice to outweigh the concerns of the competing comprehensive doctrines.  
“A political conception must be able to generate its own sufficiently strong supporting 
sense of justice.” (Rawls 2001) 
 A stand alone political conception may work to create a stable political system 
only if it is allowed to create a framework that can contain all other doctrines.  Most 
citizens in a society may not hold any well articulated comprehensive doctrine.  Rather 
people affirm their own Religious and Philosophical, associational and personal values 
with a political conception.  These views may in fact be comprehensive views that 
encompass the qualities listed above, they are also nonpolitical in nature.  These types of 
comprehensive views are neither systematic nor are they complete. (Rawls 2001) This 
allows for space inside a comprehensive doctrine for an outside conception of justice to 
gain traction and be acceptable.  The requirements for this outside concept would be that 
it be limited to the basic structure.  That its acceptance presupposes no particular 
comprehensive view.  Third, its fundamental ideas are familiar and drawn from the public 
political culture.  If what Rawls is saying here is true then it does give weight to the idea 
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that societies may in fact be able to move from a modus vivendi to an overlapping 
consensus, it just takes time, and requires a politically just basic structure in order to 
work.     
 
The Tautology of Social Cooperation 
 Here the relevancy of Rawls' question of stability is key.  Rawls creates his 
system so that it may in the belief that an overlapping consensus will be able to create a 
stability as a condition of a reasonable conception of political justice.  Such a conception 
must be able to generate its own sufficiently strong supporting sense of justice, so that 
citizens feel a sense of justification in the way in which they are governed.  In this 
however, Rawls wants to move away from the ideas of stability associated with a modus 
vivendi, or with stability as a balance of political forces. (Rawls 2001) Rawls believes 
that his system of justice would move beyond simple power sharing.  This discussion 
should begin by examining the foundational concepts needed for an overlapping 
consensus: social cooperation, public justification, and reflective equilibrium. 
 First there is the conceptualizing of society as a fair system of cooperation.  
Herein lies the first tension point between theory and reality.  Rawls states that social 
cooperation is a starting point for his theory and that the goal is to make this more 
determinate by spelling out what results when this idea is fully realized.  This becomes 
problematic if a society has not yet attained a sufficient level of social cooperation.  What 
if there are groups living in a society that do not wish to cooperate with each other? 
 The question must become how to reconcile these two societies with each other.  
When Rawls speaks of reconciliation he does so in a way that means a softening of 
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individual emotions towards society “Political philosophy may try to calm our frustration 
and rage against our society and its history...”  When this idea of reconciliation is applied 
to one's own society, there seems to be some coherency.  I question whether that same 
idea of reconciliation can be applied when that frustration and rage is directed towards a 
society that is not your own.  Conceivably this rage may be caused by a situation in 
which injustice is occurring on some basic political level, but if we are using Rawls 
model, the solution to this problem seemingly is to change the basic structure.  This 
argument becomes increasing tautological as social cooperation is needed to change the 
basic structure and a new basic structure is needed to bring two distinct groups together.   
 It then begins to be difficult to see how any sort of public justification can exist 
without a priori social cooperation.   For Rawls the idea of public justification is a natural 
extension of society based on cooperation.  He defines public justification as the way 
citizens can justify to one another their political judgements.  In times of disagreement, 
an acceptance of the idea of public justification would allow for reasoned public 
discourse.  However, this reasoned public discourse relies on an agreed upon framework 
of justice, and establishing an agreed upon framework seems impossible in Rawls system 
if there is no existing foundation of cooperation.  It also seems highly unlikely that there 
could be any sort of conception of reflective equilibrium without social cooperation.  
Rawls argues that a well-ordered society is made of citizens who have achieved a 
capacity for wide reflective equilibrium. (Rawls 2001) Reflective equilibrium is the state 
of balance between comprehensive doctrines, which is what Rawls is seeking. 
 Where Rawls' theory falls short is that it relies on an unspecified, though assumed, 
level of social cooperation.  Where social cooperation exists society can possibly reach 
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towards the conceptions of political justice.  Without this foundation it would seem 
unlikely that a fair agreement on justice that all people accept as reasonable could be 
reached.  If Rawls' theory rests on the foundation of a presumed existence of social 
cooperation but does not provide an explanation for how that social cooperation can be 
created, then perhaps we can look towards other political theories that could elaborate on 
this point.  By doing this I believe we will find a better explanation for the creation and 
functionality of social cooperation.   
 It is for this purpose that I am going to concentrate on the idea of the creation of a 
deliberative democracy.  What deliberative democracy offers to the expansion of Rawls 
is the idea that there must also be communication between groups in societies that house 
competing values systems, or as Rawls would put it comprehensive doctrines.  That it is 
the discourse between the groups that will lead people to reaching an understanding that 
cooperation is reasonable.  That the process of discourse will allow for people to 
understand each other and that this will lead to cooperative action.  This will, according 
to deliberative democratists, ultimately lead to the state of public reason.  For deliberative 
democratists it would not be enough to simply reach an agreement on a fair and just 
political system and expect that agreement would be enough to create pluralism.  This 
then could adequately explain a means for creating the social cooperation that is needed.     
 This idea comes from several different perspectives though I am going to be 
focusing mainly on the ideas of John Dryzek and Jurgen Habermas.  Habermas has 
focused much of his work on the role communicative action and the role that this plays in 
building social cooperation and order.  The difference between Habermas and Dryzek is 
the level on which this communicative action should take place in society.  While 
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Habermas believes in the need for a discourse ethic throughout all levels of society, 
Dryzek believes that deliberation needs to be maintained in a public sphere which is 
semi-detached from the politics of governance and sovereignty.    
     However, the goal for each of these two theorists, and for deliberative 
democracy is the building of social cooperation, the necessary component that Rawls 
theory is lacking in the contexts of divided societies.  Theoretically then, deliberative 
democracy offers the possibility of creating the social foundation necessary for a 
Pluralistic Society to be created.  The main reason why I chose this path to expand on 
Rawls' is that I believe that the idea of deliberative democracy is as close to being able to 
describe what I would like to call cognitive reconciliation in the political philosophy field. 
 
Habermas – Theory of Ethical Discourse1 
   A Theory of Discourse sets out to reconstruct the use of discourse in everyday life.  
For Habermas this started as an attempt to understand the history of discourse in 18th and 
19th century Europe.  He specifically looked at the development of the public sphere and 
its impacts on shaping the political and economic realities.  This lead to the creation of 
his moral-political theory which is based on the idea that interlocutors can be involved in 
critical discussion free from the pressures of social and economic pressures only in the 
public sphere.  These discussions would be a vehicle to reach an understanding on 
matters of common concern.   Habermas started his research by looking at what he 
termed “small discussion societies” and the effect that these groups had on the larger 
society as a whole.   
 
1 Note: For this section on Habermas I used the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Habermas.  
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  What Habermas discovered was that as the small discussion societies grew into 
mass publics,  the ideas themselves became commodified. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) 
From this he moved to a position of a more formal structuring of the public sphere, one 
that would be able to support his view of democratic deliberation, which Habermas 
believed would be a mechanism for the creation of a rational society.  This more 
structured public sphere would involve a concept of public opinion-formation instead of 
the idea of full public reason. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) In turn Habermas argues for the 
separation of society into two spheres, the public and the government.  The public sphere 
would be an entity where rational discourse could occur, which would then shape the 
political discourse of the government itself.     
 This shift for Habermas looked to the “practical-interest” of the human species, 
which is to secure and expand possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the 
conduct of life. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) Habermas argues that human societies depend 
on these types of understandings and the norms that these understandings lead to.  
However these understandings do not simply happen.  In order for there to be mutual self 
understanding, humans must interact with each other.  This theory of interaction became 
the foundation for what he calls communicative action, where individual actors 
coordinate their behaviors on the basis of consensual norms. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) 
What Habermas is getting at here is the idea that human beings are able to moderate our 
own behavior as well as that of others by agreement of what should and should not be 
acceptable.   
 Communicative action then is the pragmatic end of rationality if understood as 
Habermas does.  For Habermas, rationality consists not so much in the possession of 
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particular knowledge, but rather in 'how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use 
knowledge'.” (Bohman and Rehg 2007, Par 3.1 Section 4) According to Habermas, 
language is the medium for coordinating action, which fundamentally requires actors to 
orient towards “reaching understanding”.  Through describing communicative action as 
rationality, Habermas demonstrates how it is inherently different from other forms of 
action.  Other types of action would require more coercive behavior in which the 
individual goals of each actor would trump any need for mutual understanding.  Thus 
through rational discourse actors are able to determine a shared understanding of the 
inherent reasonableness of the mutually pursued goals.  
 The process then of being able to understand the shared goals though 
communicative action further leads to a coordination of action.  Habermas believes that 
communicative action is successful in creating acts of cooperation because the actors are 
able to freely agree that the goal is reasonable and worthy of cooperative behavior. 
(Bohman and Rehg 2007) This is, for Habermas, the process of how social cooperation is 
built.  However, in order to understand this more, it will be important to understand how 
he arrives at this idea.  In order to do this I will first look at his description of morals and 
ethics.  This will then lead into a wider discussion of how this works towards building 
stability in democratic governments.   
 In order for rationally motivated agreement to be possible, this type of 
communicative action must be able to meet certain acceptable conditions.  Since the goal 
of the speaker in this instance is to attempt to build cooperation, there must be grounds on 
which agreement can occur.  The actor who is making a speech act must aim towards 
being understood by the other actor(s).  “We understand a speech act when we know the 
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kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer that he is 
entitled in the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance—in short, when we 
know what makes it acceptable.” (Bohman and Rehg 2007, Sec 3.1 Par 10) 
Understanding that there must be acceptance for cooperation the actor will engage in the 
practice of reason giving.  This process of making reasoned statements for acceptance 
will ultimately lead to a give and take of criticism and justification. (Bohman and Rehg 
2007) This means that for the hearer to accept the communicative act of the speaker, that 
the hearer accepts the underlying reasoning of the speaker.  As often happens though, if 
the hearer does not accept the offer of the speaker, the discourse may change to argument 
or debate, leading the underlying reasons to be tested for truth, correctness, or 
authenticity. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) 
 Habermas then looks at the ways in which the validity of the underlying reasons 
can be accurately determined.  In the search for ways of creating validity, he argues for 
introduction of a spectrum of validity that includes moral rightness, ethical goodness or 
authenticity, personal sincerity, and aesthetic value. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) Along this 
spectrum, a claim can merit acceptance because it is “true” with-in this sphere of validity 
and dialogical context. (Bohman and Rehg 2007)  By creating this spectrum Habermas 
has allowed for a complex range of social interaction that can be involved for the purpose 
of cooperative action.  Therefore a speech act can be judged on wether it is sincere, 
socially appropriate, and at the very least representationally adequate of truthfulness.  
Social cooperation, thus conceived, depends upon acceptance of communication along 
these lines, and is both deeply consensual and reasonable.   
 Habermas builds a concept of social cooperation that relies upon the capacity of 
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actors to recognize the validity of different claims.  Social cooperation for Habermas is 
completely cognitive and reliant upon his explanation of rationality. This type of social 
cooperation is relatively well suited within the circumstances of the lifeworld that 
Habermas explains as “referring to the background resources, contexts, and dimensions 
of social action that enable actors to cooperate on the basis of mutual understanding: 
shared cultural systems of meaning, institutional orders that stabilize patterns of action, 
and personality structures acquired in family, church, neighborhood, and school.” 
(Bohman and Rehg 2007, Sec 3.1 Par 12) 
 I think here it is best to transition to an explanation of the ideal of Habermas' form 
of discourse before trying to understand how that form may work in the context of social 
cooperation across boundaries of culture.  This form of discourse is highly reliant on the 
validity of the claims made by actors.  For Habermas this entails a highly reflective form 
of communication that is based upon argumentation as a social practice. (Bohman and 
Rehg 2007) The practice of this argumentation is based upon the three aspects of product, 
procedure, and as a process which is based largely on the more traditional perspectives of 
logic, dialectic, and rhetoric. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) Each of these requires an 
assessment of the cogency of the argument, though, as Habermas points out, “at no single 
one of these analytic levels can the very idea intrinsic to argumentative speech be 
adequately developed.” (Bohman and Rehg 2007, Sec 3.2 Par 3) 
 Habermas looks to describe his theory of discourse that builds from the logical 
level of argument, one in which actors are concerned with the production aspect as they 
try to build a case based upon sets of reasons to support conclusions with the goal of 
arriving at a valid claim that can convince based upon its intrinsic properties. (Bohman 
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and Rehg 2007) For Habermas, the determination of the validity of an argument needs to 
go beyond resting on deductive certainty only, needing to how well the claim takes in all 
relevant information and possible objections. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) For Habermas, 
this represents the ideal speech situation. 
 However, Habermas soon came to hold these ideal conditions of speech overly 
reified and began to look for ways to critically judge real discourse. (Bohman and Rehg 
2007) He then lays out a rhetorically adequate process that participants can execute that 
would represent a sufficiently critical test as to the validity of an argument.  The 4 
procedures are: (i) no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded, 
(ii) participants have equal voice, (iii) they are internally free to speak their honest 
opinion without deception or self-deception, and (iv) there are no sources of coercion 
built into the process and procedures of discourse. (Bohman and Rehg 2007, Sec 3.2 Par 
6) As a critical test the fulfillment of each of these procedures would ensure that the 
outcome of any agreement would be reasonable for all parties.  By creating standards that 
provide a way of determining if the process of the discussion was itself reasonably 
conceived, I argue that this still represents an idealized form of discourse.  By relying on 
this idealized procedure for being able to come to reasonable agreement, Habermas has 
created an inherently formalized standard of discourse.  This has left his theory open to 
criticism on this aspect, though this discussion will have to wait until later in the chapter. 
 Before that discussion, it is important to look at which types of validity claims 
Habermas believes his theory applies.  For example, he believed that claims about the 
sincerity of interior subjective feelings, desires, beliefs were not realms that were open to 
rational analysis. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) For Habermas, the ability to judge the 
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sincerity of these is through the actions of the person or group making the claim. 
(Bohman and Rehg 2007) Conversely, the types of claims that are open to discursive 
justification generally fall into two categories.  The first being truth claims and the 
second being right claims.  Habermas further elaborated on these as being a difference of 
empirical-truth claims and claims about moral rightness. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) 
Emperical-truth claims reside mostly in the realms of science and moral rightness claims 
will be one that I am focusing on in this paper.   
 The other that I will focus on is claims of authenticity.  Authenticity claims are a 
third category of validity claims that Habermas believes fits into his discourse framework. 
Habermas argues that authenticity claims are made about what is considered to be good, 
thus differentiating authenticity from truth and rightness.  Claims made in a discourse 
about what constitutes a good life are influenced directly by life histories, traditions, and 
particular values. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) This means that there is not an expectation of 
reaching any sort of universal consensus. (Bohman and Rehg 2007)  Authenticity then 
exists almost entirely in the realm of ethics, either personal or group. 
 Together both rightness and authenticity claims make up one of the foundational 
problems in pluralistic society. The ability for members of plural societies to assess the 
reasonableness of other groups' claims of rightness and authenticity are major hurdles in 
the creation of social cooperation.  Habermas' theory of discourse provides a measured 
perspective on how this could be accomplished.  The inter-relatability of rightness and 
authenticity is key to understanding the way towards reconciling the differences.  For 
Habermas the process of reconciling difference is seemingly through a process that he 
calls universalization.  
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Universalization 
 Habermas describes the role of discourse in the creation rational moral norms as 
the process of Universalization.  The goal of universalization is to come to an impartial 
moral point of view.  The use of a discursive process means that each person must be able 
to justify their morals in a way that is acceptable for all others present.  Thus if one 
assumes that dialogue is a requirement for moral discourse then we arrive at the principle 
of universalization.  In this process the discourse principle can functionally be used to test 
the impartiality of moral norms.  A moral norm can be considered impartial when the 
general observance of that norm “can allow the interests and value-orientations of each 
individual can be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.” (Bohman and 
Rehg 2007, Sec 3.4 Par 4) 
 The moral norms then become general binding obligations whose acceptance thus 
affects each person's pursuit of interests and the good life.  This stems from Habermas' 
belief that the discourse principle and universalization are not simply thought 
experiments, that the only way to determine moral norms is through the process of 
discourse.  Thus Habermas insists that universalization is a principle of real discourse: an 
individual's moral judgement only counts as fully reasonable only if it issues from 
participation in actual discourse with all of those affected.  Moreover, it is imperative that 
one gain the reasonable agreement of other's in forming one's conscience.  
 This represents for Habermas the view that the morals of an individual should be 
directly influenced by the morals of society.  That no moral claim can made by any 
individual that does not in some way find acceptance from the rest of the members of a 
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society.  In this sense I believe that this theory would only apply to the things that can be 
moralized, which Habermas addresses in his discourse theory.  This criticism has lead 
many to the belief that discourse ethics and the universalization of moral norms is only 
truly plausible in the realm of the legal and the political.   
 
Legal-Political 
 The goal of Habermas' democratic theory is to provide an account of legitimate 
law and law making.   This theory is built largely on the discourse principle, which 
Habermas defines thusly: A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, only if all 
those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse. (Bohman 
and Rehg 2007) This is important because Habermas argues, similarly as Rawls, that in 
order for society to be stable over time it must be viewed as legitimate by the people.  
When the discourse principle is extended to spheres of legality and politics we arrive at 
the basis for this legitimization.  For Habermas, this looks at the relationship between 
private and public autonomy.  For people to be able to view laws as valid, they must have 
the protection of the law for their individual freedoms. (Bohman and Rehg 2007)This is 
considered the private autonomy.  The individual freedoms associated with the private 
autonomy can only be considered as free if the citizens can also understand themselves as 
the authors of the laws protecting those freedoms. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) This can 
only occur by the practice of public autonomy.  Thus the private and public are 
inextricably linked in Habermas' theory. 
   The combination of liberty (private autonomy) and political participation (public 
autonomy) combine to create an abstract system of basic rights that serve to set a 
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normative framework based upon a minimal set of institutional conditions. (Bohman and 
Rehg 2007) The institutional mechanisms of the government would then fit within this 
framework.  This would also create a process of public discourse for legitimization of 
ordinary legislation.  As Habermas states, “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that 
can meet with the assent of all citizens.” (Bohman and Rehg 2007, Sec 3.4 Par 15) As 
decisions about laws tend to involve a combination of validity claims, this justification 
process would include the types of tests that Habermas proposes for claims of validity.   
 Thus citizens would openly be discussing claims of authenticity, feasibility, and 
moral rightness of legislation in the public sphere.  Much of the criticism of Habermas' 
revolves around whether or not citizens would be able to separate morality from ethical 
and pragmatic considerations. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) Habermas counters this 
argument by pointing out that in the democratic theory there is much less of an emphasis 
on the creation of consensus.  Instead, what is being sought is the “warranted assumption 
of reasonableness”. (Bohman and Rehg 2007, Sec 3.4 Par 17) In this sense citizens can 
justify the laws if process warrants the presumption that the outcomes are reasonable 
products of a sufficiently inclusive deliberative process. (Bohman and Rehg 2007) 
 In this way Habermas attempts to build a democratic system that rests on the need 
for cognitive validity.  This cognitive validity follows from the types of rationally 
motivated agreements that make up Haberamas' discourse theory.   Thus the types of 
communicative actions that lead to the coordination of actions are essential parts of the 
democratic theory.  Habermas has built a theory of a rational society that is founded on 
discursive procedures that would lead to all citizens accepting the reasonableness of their 
society by accepting that the procedures themselves are reasonable.  For Habermas, this 
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rational society would be constructed through the creation of the social cooperation that 
comes through rational discourse.   
 Habermas' theory holds great value in relatively stable societies, and can act as a 
way of moving a society towards greater levels of cooperation and stability through 
rational means.  What is not clear is how this formalized system of discourse would hold 
up in the context of a divided society. Is it likely that people living in divided societies 
would be able to agree upon authenticity of claims?  Would it be possible to come to 
universalized set of moral standards? In order to explore these questions further, I turn to 
the work of Dryzek 
 
Dryzek – Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies2 
 Using the theories of Habermas as a platform, Dryzek has expanded concerning 
the power of communication and deliberation to build stable pluralistic democracies.  The 
goal of Habermas and Dryzek is the same.  The major critique that Dryzek makes is that 
the level of discursive ethics that Habermas seeks is not possible in the context of an 
electoral democracy.  In order for the ideas to work they must be pulled out of the contest 
for sovereignty and fully into the public sphere.  This would conceivably allow for 
dialogue to happen across a divided society without the burdens of a zero sum 
contestation for power.   This acknowledgment by Dryzek that deliberation is difficult in 
the context of a contest for power is extremely important for this conversation.   
 While the foundations are the same in that both advocate for a deliberative form 
 
2 Note: For this section I chose to focus on Dryzek because of the nature of his work being a more 
empirical study of deliberative democracy in divided societies.  I feel that while author's such as 
Guttman and Thompson are in fact relevant, that Dryzek's work was more specific to this discussion.    
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of democracy of Habermas and Dryzek make a few different conclusions in how 
discourse should interact with politics.  Dryzek is focused on taking the theories of 
discourse and of deliberative democracy and applying those theories to the contexts of 
divided societies.  This application allows for a realistic insight into the difficulties and 
challenges that rational discourse faces in situations where “a way of processing the 
toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity in deeply divided 
societies can be understood.” (Dryzek 2005, 219) 
 What Dryzek believes in is a form of democracy that will allow people living in a 
divided society to be able to discursively bridge the barriers of difference, thus enabling 
that society to function in a way that is stable.  Dryzek starts his explanation of 
deliberative democracy with the statement that what is being offered is “Deliberation 
across divided identities is hard. On a widely shared account, deliberation is what 
Bessette calls the "mild voice of reason"-exactly what is lacking in tough identity issues, 
at best an aspiration for how opponents might one day learn to interact once their real 
differences are dissolved.” (Dryzek 2005, 219) He argues for a deliberative democracy 
that would be able to handle the deep differences, and his solution to this is found in 
decoupling the deliberative and the decisional.  This would allow for the deliberations to 
be held in a way that the outcome does not include the winning or losing of power.  This 
would allow for the deliberative process to be free of that particular zero sum battle.   
 Dryzek believes that these deliberations can occur without threatening the 
identities of any individual or group.  In his theory, he is looking to build a foundation of 
discourse that can find ways for people of different identities to communicate on issues 
that are vital to nation as a whole.  This politics of engagement is able to process 
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contentious issues by focusing the conversation on the issues that are relevant for all 
members of the society.  In this way, if the focus can remain on needs rather than on 
values, it is less likely that violence will ensue. “But if individuals can listen to each 
others' stories, they might at least accept one another's specific needs which can be 
reconciled, even when value systems and identities cannot.” (Dryzek 2005, 225) So by 
seemingly endorsing Forester's precept about accepting each other's needs is Dryzek 
making the case for the deliberative model being used in these types of cases?  This 
would certainly be a refining of Habermas' discourse model.  Though Habermas would 
likely endorse the use of the discourse principle for this, it seems that Dryzek is trying to 
limit the scope.  “Engagement is less likely to end up in hostility if the focus is on 
specific needs (security, education, etc.) rather than general values.” (Dryzek 2005, 225) 
 Secondly he argues to “loosen the connection between the deliberation and 
decision moments” as he calls them.  In this it seems that he is trying to take the 
discourse principle to a more informal setting in the hopes that this will be able to more 
effectively shape politics in the way that Habermas desires, though in this he does 
slightly differ from Habermas.  In divided societies it is certainly true that there is a 
power struggle between identities for the control of the mechanisms of power.  Even in 
stable democracies identity politics is a major issue that is in constant flux.  In divided 
societies identity power struggles can act to reinforce the divisions on a societal level.  In 
order for the ideas to work they must be pulled out of the contest for sovereignty and 
fully into the public sphere.  This would conceivably allow for dialogue to happen across 
a divided society without the burdens of a zero sum contestation for power.   This 
acknowledgment by Dryzek that deliberation is difficult in the context of a contest for 
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power is extremely important for this conversation.  In this I agree with Dryzek. What 
Dryzek doesn't make clear is how moving the discourse principle out of this contestation 
will actually work to counteract this.     
 The greatest strength of Dryzek's work is that he is able to demonstrate the need 
for discourse in divided society.   For Dryzek deliberative democracy is a practice of 
discourse that allows for a shared way of making sense of the world embedded in 
language.  communication must be capable of inducing reflection, be non-coercive, and 
capable of linking a particular experience with a more general point or principle.  These 
deliberations should point to larger, more abstract, principles that can be more easily 
accepted my all.  This is in line with Habermas' appeal to the universalization of morals.   
 Dryzek moves dialogue to the public sphere, but in that all that he focuses on is 
the difference between “cold” and “hot” deliberative settings.  In this he argues that the 
“hot” settings are not conducive for coming to agreement over positions for the reason 
that people rarely will change their positions on topics even when another's argument 
may have have actually caused this to happen.  In this case it will be much more valuable 
for the participant to save face and not lose authority or standing in the group.  The cold 
type of setting that Dryzek endorses resembles two sorts of institutions networks and 
discursive designs.  The networks are described as loosely formed groups with little 
centralized leadership.  Though for these these groups to work, Dryzek acknowledges 
that there would first need to be a “relatively well-behaved political system”.  However, 
the informal nature of these networks would be difficult to achieve in divided societies 
where there is a high level of in-group communication and little communication between 
groups.   
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 Since this is the case, it further shows the challenges that this type of discursive 
process has in building social cohesion between groups in a divided society. This is not to 
say that I do not believe that this process is without merit. It is just not well suited for 
building social cohesion in divided societies.  Social cohesion being what is necessary for 
the theories to work in these contexts.  First, though, I believe it is beneficial to define 
cognitive reconciliation before moving to ways to build social cohesion. 
 
Cognitive Reconciliation 
 To understand best the way that I am attempting to draw out a definition of what 
cognitive reconciliation represents, I believe that it will be best to summarize briefly the 
principles of each author that I am using to build this definition.  In understanding the 
core concepts I believe that it will easier to discern the ways that political philosophy has 
made a case for reconciliation in the creation of society.   For Rawls, reasonable 
differences between comprehensive doctrines can be resolved by agreements on a 
conception of justice.  This type of consensus allows for each identity group to accept a 
place in without having to relinquish their core beliefs.  As longs as these beliefs remain 
in the private sphere and do not effect the agreements of justice.  This thereby reconciles 
the differences of the between comprehensive doctrines through agreement on the public 
conceptions of justice.           
 For Habermas social cooperation is built upon ethical discourse.  Strong ethics 
provide the foundation for argumentation.  This is not built upon rhetoric but on the 
ability of people to provide rational reasons for their beliefs.  These reasons would need 
to be acceptable to all people in order to be considered rational.  This process is 
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dependent on the conception of moral universalization.  This is a process that allows for 
the creation of impartial moral standards.  Any moral principle that cannot be accepted by 
all as reasonable is not impartial and therefor cannot be used as a standard for society.  In 
this there is a sense of being able to reconcile difference through a discursive process that 
leads to an understanding by all members of society of an impartial norm that is 
agreeable to all.                                
 For Dryzek, discourse needs to be separated from the machinations of politics and 
sovereignty.  This type of discourse needs to be used in “cold settings that are able to 
foster ideas that can then influence and shape the dialogue of the political sphere.  This 
process will help to foster trust between divided groups through discourse, allowing for 
bridges to be built between identity groups.  This works in two prongs for Dryzek.  First, 
there must be a movement towards abstract ideas and second this then allows for 
discourse on the needs of the society.  This conceptually would allow people to move 
beyond their desire for things like revenge and see ways for working with people who 
were previously antagonists.                                                                                                                                               
   If we are to take a foundation for Cognitive Reconciliation from the ideas 
of political philosophy, then we can define this concept as the ability to have reasonable 
moral and ethical discourse about the issues of the society as whole.  This is discourse 
that will bring a sense of social cooperation as people see members of other groups as 
being participants in this larger ideas of reasonable expectations of justice.  This also 
works towards a definition of cognitive reconciliation as the ability of adversarial groups 
to be able to settle societal disputes through a process of rational discussion and 
reasonable agreements.  Cognitive reconciliation then is to come to a shared sense of 
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what is a reasonable foundation for society.  It means that people have been able to 
accept different values, ethics and beliefs as also having a reasonable foundation.  On that 
basis it is possible then to have an acceptance of the conception of a society in which 
those difference can exist together equally.   
 Ultimately, I believe that we can distill a concept for cognitive reconciliation into 
three main components.  First, it is represented by the idea that reconciliation in 
pluralistic societies can be achieved by means of problem solving through discourse.  
Secondly, that this discourse must rely on the use of reason and rationality.  Thirdly, that 
consensus built through this discourse signifies a reconciling of differences.  A society 
that is built upon this model will be one that is able to be stable for generations.  However, 
when the theories on the use of rational discourse and reasonable agreements are applied 
to contexts of divided societies, we can see that there are difficulties in applying the 
theories to the situations.  
 What this chapter has demonstrated is that cognitive reconciliation may not be 
sufficient when dealing with societies that are lacking social cohesion.  Rawls theory on 
the creation of just and fair agreements on political structures is dependent upon the 
existence of an a priori level of social cooperation.  Habermas believes that social 
cooperation will come about through discourse, namely that communicative action will 
lead to the realization of cooperative goals.  However, this discourse needs structure so 
that it will in fact lead to the outcome that Habermas desires.  As shown, this discursive 
process needs a formalized, agreed upon, set of rules and is best tied into a formalized 
system.  What Habermas' theory cannot account for is the lack of basic levels of cohesion, 
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absent in societies that have been divided by violence, but necessary to come to 
agreements on moral rightness and authenticity claims.  Dryzek demonstrates the 
difficulties that these theories have when applied to divided societies.  What we will 
explore next is a way to add a layer to the political theory that I believe will ultimately 
strengthen the overall argument.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 40 
CHAPTER III 
AFFECTIVE RECONCILIATION: THE BUILDING OF SOCIAL COHESION 
 
“At each level of society – grassroots, middle, and elite – coexistence requires changes in the emotional, 
psychological, and perceptual attitudes of individuals who have lived through unthinkable trauma and who 
still live in fear and hatred of the 'enemy' that has caused them pain.”  - Diana Chigas and Brian Ganson  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 To move forward in this discussion we will need to explore the relationship 
between affect and cognition.  It will be my argument that the political theories have 
relied too heavily on the use of rationality and reason.  While political philosophy has 
provided the theoretical foundation of how to build societies based upon reason and 
rationality, it has not taken into account the role that feelings and emotions have in the 
equation.  This part of the discussion is especially important when looking at pluralistic 
societies where groups have engaged in violence against each other.  Violence, especially 
on the scale talked about here, causes negative emotions and feelings between those 
groups.  These negative emotions and feelings are a main cause of the divisions in the 
society.  As shown, this lack of social cohesion is unlikely to be overcome with the use of 
rationality and reason. What must be explored are the ways that feelings and emotions 
can be changed and, subsequently, how to build social cohesion. 
 To do this, we will first turn towards an understanding of human psychology that 
will help to explain some of the ways that feelings and emotions influence our 
perceptions of rationality and reason.  The first part of this chapter will look at the social 
psychology literature on the primacy of affect.  This will lead into a discussion of some 
of the ways in which affect limits people's capacity to use reason.   At the end of this 
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chapter I will look at possible ways of creating positive affective change through a 
discussion on the practices of conflict resolution.  It is through this discussion that I will 
be establishing a framework for a better understanding of what I am calling affective 
reconciliation and the importance that this form of reconciliation has in societies that 
have experienced violence.        
 While there is still not full consensus on the ways in which affective 
reconciliation is most effective or the ways in which a proper balance can be found 
between different models, the idea that reconciliation needs to occur at the emotional 
level is undisputed in the literature.  What does seem to be lacking is a more firm 
understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of how the practices fit into the larger 
discussion.  In order then to have a better understanding of where these foundations come 
from, I turn to social psychology.  It is through the work of social psychologists that we 
can begin to understand the underpinnings of the role that affective reconciliation plays, 
and it's necessity in the building of peaceful societies.  By looking at this material, a 
picture will begin to emerge of the role that affect and intuition play in the motivations 
that people have for the behaviors and actions reflected in the social world.   
 In social psychology we find ideas on affect that are in stark contrast with the 
conceptions of reason of rationality in chapter II. The field of Psychology has been in an 
intense debate over the past half century over the role and primacy of cognitive and 
affective functions.  Much of the contemporary literature in the field today has focused 
on the role that affect plays in people's perceptions of reason and rationality.  By focusing 
on the social psychology literature that discusses the ways that affect influences cognitive 
functions, I believe that a contrast between reason and affect can be shown clearly.  We 
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will start this exploration with the research on the primacy of affect, which states that 
primary way that humans process external stimuli is through an affective process.  Then, 
we will look at the research that shows the way in which these affective intuitions lead to 
moral judgements.  Lastly, we will look at the studies that show how this process 
manifests the phenomena of motivated reason and reactive devaluation.   An 
understanding of these concepts will help to better understand the ways in which affect 
works and why it is important to understand these concepts in this discussion.    
 What this chapter will ultimately show is that the practices of the field of conflict 
resolution offer a solution to questions raised by the social psychologists.  That it is 
possible to reach the outcomes sought by political philosophy by reconciling on an 
affective level.  I use the term Affective Reconciliation to describe the ability to reconcile 
with others through the process of transforming emotion.  Affective reconciliation can 
also be seen as being the ability of people to change the social circumstances that are left 
after violent conflict has occurred.   
 
The Psychology of Affect 
  We will begin our exploration in this chapter with a discussion on what is affect.  
Affect is described as the experience of feelings or emotions. (MA Hogg et. all 2010) The 
most common way that human beings use affect is through the emotional processing of 
stimuli and behavior outputs. (Zajonc 1980) As such, affective reactions are generally 
separated from the content of the experience.  For example, people will more easily 
remember how a movie made them feel for a longer period of time than they will 
remember what the movie was about.   
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 This is all different than the process of cognition.  Cognition describes the way in 
which people process information and reach a decision that is based upon the rational 
comparisons between competing options.  Much of the cognitive process was described 
in Chapter II.  I think that the best way of describing the difference is that affect 
represents the feeling aspects of life and cognition represents the thinking.  In order to 
draw this distinction more clearly between affect and cognition, we will begin by looking 
at the work of RB Zajonc on the primacy of affect.   
  
The Primacy of Affect 
 The ideas that make up the theory of the primacy of affect start to take shape in 
the work of RB Zajonc.  Zajonc sets out to show that the process that is used to react to 
stimuli is one that is initiated by affect systems.  The main goal for Zajonc is to show that 
the way in which human beings process information is almost entirely affective.  He is 
attempting to push back against the psychologists in the 1950's and 60's who were 
attempting to take the field of psychology towards a conclusion that thinking comes 
before feeling.        
 Zajonc comes from a social psychology background, and so constructs his work 
starting from that direction, commenting on the fact that social functions are based on 
almost pure affect experience.  “There are probably very view perceptions and cognitions 
in everyday life that do not have a significant affective component..” (Zajonc 1984, 153) 
Therefore, according to Zajonc, it is important to understand the difference between 
thinking and feeling.  Everyday human beings take in an enormous amount of 
information through our senses.  From those inputs we must make decisions, in many 
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cases this requires split second processes.  It is believed that because of the fast nature of 
these responses that it may take a minimal amount of actual cognition to transform the 
initial input into action.  Thus the responses that human beings have in their day to day 
lives are largely based on this fast process. 
 The initial stages of this process are almost entirely affective and have little, if no, 
cognitive input.  Cognitive thoughts may enter this sequence at various stages, though 
these cognitions generally become a construction of the initial feeling, a way of 
rationalizing that emotion. (Zajonc 1984)  We make decisions based mostly on our initial 
affective judgement and then after, we use the cognitive information to provide reasons 
why we made the decision. (Zajonc 1984) Further clarifying the idea, Zajonc points out 
that in order for a decision to be cognitive, all options must first be weighed equally 
against each other, weighing all the pros and cons, and only then arriving at the decision.  
There is simply no evidence that this process occurs more than on limited occasions. 
(Zajonc 1984) The judgements that are made in this way would require slow processing.  
Most decisions in life occur quickly and are usually characterized by an overwhelming 
attachment to one alternative over the other. (Zajonc 1984) The choice of a certain 
alternative is based on little more than “I like this alternative” the most.    
 It is these initial 'feelings' that help human beings to assign meaning to the inputs 
that are received.  The emotional reactions help us to determine the differences in what 
we perceive.  For example this allows for determinations of the good vs. the bad (Saber-
toothed Tiger vs Antelope), the strong vs weak (Saber-toothed Tiger vs Mosquito), and 
the quick vs. the slow (Saber-toothed Tiger vs Quicksand). (Zajonc 1984) These 
determinations were all necessary for survival.  This process is also almost completely 
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involuntary, and easily influenced by our surroundings. (Zajonc 1984) The reactionary 
nature of this process means that it is difficult to control by any sort of attentive measures. 
(Zajonc 1984) 
 Another characteristic of the affect process is that it generally produces outputs 
that are difficult to challenge.  As Zajonc states, “We can readily accept that the fact that 
(our cognitive judgements) can be wrong. But we are never wrong about what we like or 
dislike.” (Zajonc 1984, 157) The perseverance of the initial output is so strong that it is 
'virtually impervious' to persuasion, even when the cognitive basis for the output can be 
shown to be invalid. (Zajonc 1984) Even when no other actual evidence exists, or there is 
no other cognitive way to voice the reasons to support the initial reaction, it is still likely 
that people will maintain their initial impressions. (Zajonc 1984) “(T)his certainty that we 
like what we like is often accompanied by our inability to verbalize the reasons for our 
attraction or repulsion..” (Zajonc 1984, 157) 
 Zajonc bases his assessment of this on the work of Nesbitt and Wilson who 
performed a study of the research looking into whether people are capable of reporting on 
why they are performing certain behaviors. Their findings go towards disputing the claim 
of several author's that human behavioral systems are a fully cognitive process. They 
state that “it is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking, that appears 
spontaneously in consciousness.” (Nesbitt and Wilson 1977, 232) They were able to 
conclude this by looking at the results of the work done on the ability to verbalize 
behavioral motives.  What they discovered was that humans are generally unable to state 
why they make certain decisions, or are wrong in their assessments.  “The overall results 
thus confound any assumption that conscious, verbal cognitive processes result in 
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conscious, verbalizable changes in evaluations or motive states which then mediates 
behavior.” (Nesbitt and Wilson 1977, 235) 
 This is significant because verbal report is tended to be seen as evidence of 
cognitive functioning.  The fact that subjects were not able to verbalize the reasons for 
their behavioral changes highly suggests that the motivations behind their behaviors is 
likely non-cognitive.  Though this study does tend to show that this motivation-behavior 
system can be manipulated, it does not suggest that the behaviors are likely to change 
purely based upon changes in cognition.  The actual change occurred because the 
researchers modified the fear response mechanism in certain subjects.  This, then, also 
lends credence to the idea that changes in behavior are likely to come more through a 
change in stimuli to the affect appraisal system than through a cognitive change.  
 For Nesbitt and Wilson, this still left a question, though, of whether the 
respondents in these tests were aware that any change had occurred, and if so what might 
be attributed as the cause for the change.  If no awareness was reported it would further 
suggest that people are cognitively unaware of the existence of a process.  In order to 
show this Nesbitt and Wilson added a step to similar types of tests as previously 
mentioned.  This extra step involved asking the respondents questions after the tests had 
been conducted.  For example, the author's cite a test in which participants were 
convinced that a pill they were taking would mimic all of the symptoms of electric shock.  
The participants were the subjected to electric shock to test whether the 'pill' would have 
any effect.  The pill that was given was a placebo, however the effect that it had on 
participants was real.  On average, the people who took the pill endured 4 times the 
amount of electric shock as those who did not receive the pill. When asked why they 
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were able to withstand more of the shock than normal, respondents come up with answers 
that had nothing to do with taking the pill.  Even when the respondents were told about 
the reason for the test and that the pill was actually fake, the respondents generally agreed 
that the pill likely would have an effect on other test takers, but that it still did not have an 
effect on them.  Thus the author's concluded that while participants had likely attributed 
the discomfort of the electric shock to the pill and were therefore able to take more of the 
shock, they were unaware that this had taken place.  
 What this study showed was peoples' inability to access the motivations behind 
certain behaviors that the researchers were attempting to alter. This further suggested that 
the cause of the change in behavior was due to a non-cognitive process.  This supports 
the conclusions that Zajonc reached about the role of the affective system in processing 
external inputs.  This also show that reason may be a secondary function to affect.  To 
better understand the implications of this, we turn next to the work done on the use of 
affect in the creation of moral judgements. 
 
Moral Judgements and Reasoning 
 Building from the studies of Zajonc, Nesbitt, and Wilson, Jonathan Haidt takes 
the understanding of affective intuition and applies it to the creation of moral judgements.  
In this same vein as the previous author's, Haidt is attempting to push back against the 
purely rationalist models of moral judgement creation.  Haidt bases his model on social 
intuitionism.  This is the idea in philosophy that “there are moral truths and that when 
people grasp these truths they do not do so by a process of ratiocination and reflection but 
rather by a process more akin to perception.” (Haidt 2001, 814) Notice that Haidt uses 
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very similar language to both the studies done by Zajonc and Nesbitt and Wilson.  The 
argument is that intuition, perceptions, and emotions come first.  In Haidt's case he argues 
that moral emotions lead to moral judgements.  To make the case for this he sets out to 
demonstrate 4 things: (a) There are two cognitive processes at work—reasoning and 
intuition—and the reasoning process has been overemphasized; (b) reasoning is often 
motivated; (c) the reasoning process constructs post hoc justifications, yet we experience 
the illusion of objective reasoning; and (d) moral action covaries with moral emotion 
more than with moral reasoning.” (Haidt 2001, 815) 
 Haidt also then categorizes these into three categories which he defines as moral 
intuition, moral judgements, and moral reasoning.  These are defined as follows: 
 
Moral Intuition:  Contrasted with moral reasoning, this is the seemingly instantaneous 
judgement that appears suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness.  This means that the 
outcome of the cognitive effort is aware to the person but not the process.  Moral 
intuition may include affective appraisals (good-bad, like-dislike) though it is defined as 
the contrast between emotional and cognitive, as intuition can also be a cognitive process. 
(Haidt 2001) A good way of describing moral intuition is this: “One sees or hears about a 
social event and instantly feels approval or disapproval.” (Haidt 2001, 818) For instance, 
Haidt uses the example of a brother and sister who both willingly decide to have a sexual 
relationship.  No matter what other factors are involved in the context of the story, we 
will all have an immediate reaction of either approving or disapproving of this action.   
Moral Judgements: Haidt defines moral judgement as the process of social evaluations 
that take place to determine the validity of the actions and character of a person living in 
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any society. (Haidt 2001) Many of these judgements are made about skills or talents, 
though, possibly more important for this discussion, are the judgements that people make 
about fairness, honesty, and virtue.  All of these assessments come through social 
interaction, discussions between people living together, and these discussions have 
consequences for future interactions with the people in society.  Referring back to the 
example above of the brother and sister, each persons intuition about their behavior will 
lead to judgements about not only the situation, but of the people involved as well.  These 
evaluations, and the way that those are formed is crucial in a discussion of reconciliation.   
Moral Reasoning: This is defined by Haidt as the “conscious mental activity that 
consists of transforming given information about people in order to reach a moral 
judgement.” (Haidt 2001, 818) Haidt also compares this type of reasoning to scientific 
hypothesizing in that this process usually entails people searching for relevant evidence 
that supports the moral judgement, weighing the evidence, coordinating the evidence 
with theories, and then reaching a decision. (Haidt 2001) This process may include steps 
that are performed unconsciously. (Haidt 2001) This process would exclude any type of 
momentary intuitive response such as sudden flashes of insight and gut reactions. (Haidt 
2001) 
 What Haidt proposes is that the social intuitionist model explains how moral 
judgements come directly from moral intuitions and that moral reasoning comes as an ad 
hoc explanation for the judgement.  This is very much in line with Zajonc (intuition) and 
Nesbitt and Wilson (post-intuition reasoning).  This also goes towards the idea that 
morals and judgments are not going to be persuaded by reason or rationality.  In the case 
of any sort of affective intuition that a person or group of people have towards another 
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person or group of people are not likely to be changed unless the process itself is 
affective.  Thus it is likely that if it is possible to transform the ways in which previously 
hostile groups see each other, the process that will need to taken will need to be an 
affective one. 
 To break this down further, lets accept that the way in which people judge other 
people is though affective systems in the brain. What we are looking for in affective 
reconciliation is the ability to change a previously negative affective judgement (this 
person is bad) to a positive affective judgement (this person is good).  The argument that 
I put forth is that if this is possible, then it is much more likely that people will be able to 
live together in the same society.  The counter argument is then also true.  If the moral 
judgement is that those people are bad, then it is unlikely that a functional society can be 
built between those groups of people.   
 From the understanding of Haidt, Zajonc, Nesbitt and Wilson, one can see an easy 
path to understanding how the The Social psychology arguments play out as follows: it is 
the limbic system that takes and processes initial sensory inputs and the initial response to 
these inputs is an emotional response (affective).  The affective response to stimuli works 
mostly in binaries: good-bad, like-dislike, fight-flight.  This initial assessment of a 
situation becomes the 'feeling' that a person has about said situation and this feeling is 
very difficult to change.  It is also not likely to change through attempts at cognitive 
persuasion.  Cognitive change can occur, but only on things that are also cognitive 
decisions.  The affective change, if possible, can only come through affective processes. 
Affect is also where human beings derive their motivation for action.   
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Motivated Reasoning 
 As a demonstration of the studies on affect primacy and moral reasoning, several 
social psychologists have conducted studies on the way in which the mind works when 
processing empirical facts.  One of these is the idea of motivated reason and is defined by 
Kahan as, “motivated reasoning refers to the tendency of people to conform assessments 
of information to some goal or end extrinsic to accuracy.” (Kahan et. All 2012, 408) It is 
psychologically easier to reason away contradictions than it is to revise feelings.  Feelings 
come first, and evidence is mostly used in service to those feelings. (Redlawsk et. all 
2010) This most often happens in situations when “the goal of protecting one's identity or 
standing in affinity groups that shares fundamental values can generate motivated 
cognition relating to relevant facts.” (Kahan et. All 2012, 408) In other words, when a 
piece of information is presented, a person is more likely to find the parts of that 
information that will confirm held beliefs rather than process any of the information that 
might challenge that belief.  As Kahan points out, the cause of this phenomena is 
believed to be found in the socializing that is part of being in a group.        
 Kahan explains this further as the need to protect one's identity, which is tied into 
the identity that one has with-in a group.  The group provides for the need of the 
individual and thus it becomes paramount to protect one's status in the group.  This is 
why individuals display what Kahan calls identity-protective cognition. (Kahan 2012) 
Every social group has a certain conception of how the world is and the way that it 
should be. It becomes the responsibility of the individual in each group to defend this 
group conception. (Kahan 2012) If, then, a member does not display loyalty to the 
accepted perceptions of the group, this will mark that person as untrustworthy and the 
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status with-in the group has now become compromised. (Kahan 2012)  Thus a member of 
a social group will only process the parts of information that work to prove the already 
held belief. 
 A study conducted by Kahan goes further to demonstrate the effects of motivated 
reasoning.  In this study, Kahan used a recorded protest to test whether or not the an 
affinity with the cause of the protest would shape peoples perception of the legitimacy of 
the protesters' actions and the actions of the police that are present at the protest.  
Through this study, Kahan wanted to show the effects that motivated reasoning has on 
perceptions of fairly normal occurrences like that of seeing a protest.  Kahan wanted to 
look specifically at the way people process an event, in this case a protest, and determine 
which of the facts that people perceive as taking place.  What the study will show is that 
people perceive facts differently depending on their own moral judgements.  This 
demonstrates the idea that people will find the facts that best support their beliefs while at 
the same time ignoring the facts that might be subversive to their cultural claims.  This is 
all in the name of protecting the values of the group that the person has an affinity with, 
while protecting their place in that group.   
 The participants for this study were made up of 200 Americans selected at random 
from a national sample. (Kahan 2012) These people were then separated into 4 different 
categories based upon the answers to a political views questionnaire that differentiate 
between two spectrums.  The first of these was between individualism and 
communitarianism.  The second was between hierarchical and egalitarianism.  This made 
4 different possible combinations.  After determining where the participants fell on these 
spectrums they were then split evenly into two groups. The first group would be told that 
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the protests were taking place at an abortion clinic with the protesters aimed at stoping 
doctors and nurses from performing abortions.  The second group was told that the 
protests were held at a military recruiting station and aimed at protesting the ban on 
openly gay and lesbians being able to join.  
 Participants were then told that they would be adjudicating a case made by the 
protestors that the police in the video had wrongfully stopped the protests.  The claim was 
made on the grounds that the protestors were not actually breaking any laws, though the 
police had claimed that the protestors were blocking traffic and that they were harassing 
people who were attempting to gain access to the facilities in question.  The participants 
were asked to make a determination on this claim and use the evidence from the video to 
support their decision.  Kahan predicted that people would make determinations on 
whether to support the protestors or the police based upon whether they agreed with the 
underlying reasons for the protests or not. (Kahan 2012)  
 The results of the study showed this hypothesis to be true.  In both conditions 
roughly fifty percent of the participants voted that the police were liable for wrongfully 
ceasing the protests. (Kahan 2012) The split over whether the police officers were at fault 
was exactly along the lines of how participants identified politically.   After watching the 
video, the participants were asked to determine as to what level they agreed or disagreed 
to witnessing events that had taken place in the video.  All of the questions pertained to 
events that had actually occurred in the video, this was simply to judge what events each 
participant had processed. (Kahan 2012) As expected, participants only processed the 
events in the video that would support their conclusion on whether the protests were 
justified or not.  For example, if a participant agreed with the protesters that it was wrong 
 54 
to exclude openly gay or lesbian people from joining the military, then the respondent 
would only witness the events that supported the protestors.  The opposite was true for 
people viewing under this condition who disagreed with the protestors.      
 As a way of further lending credence to this finding, Kahan also asked the 
participants if they believed that protests were a legitimate expression of political 
disagreement.   The participants in the experiment showed no inherent bias that protests 
themselves are wrong, all agreed that protests were a right that should be protected.  Thus 
the difference in whether or not participants thought that the protests were legitimate or 
illegitimate came down entirely to the cultural values and judgments that the participants 
claimed to hold.  This shows that while people may agree in principle that a certain 
conception of justice should in fact exist, people are at the same time divided on when 
that right is being enacted rightly in the public sphere.  As I will show later, these 
differences are all motivated by the underlying affective intuitions influencing the moral 
judgements.  
 
Reactive Devaluation  
 Another phenomena that demonstrates the primacy of affect is what is called 
Reactive Devaluation.  Moaz set out to show how the theories of affect applied to the 
context of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.  The goal was to show that the perceptions 
that each side have of each other has a profound impact on how proposals made during 
negotiations are perceived.  Reactive Devaluation is a cognitive bias that occurs when a 
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proposal is devalued if it appears to originate from an antagonist.3  This is built from 
what are called attribution errors, which is the phenomena described by the Heiderian 
balance.  This theory states that a negatively valenced source will equal a negatively 
valenced object.  Valence refers to the subjective evaluation of positive and negative 
emotions.  What the Heidarian balance means then is that if an object is associated with a 
group or person that is viewed negatively, that object will also be viewed negatively.  
What this study shows is that this also extends to objects such as peace proposals. 
 This study consisted of three separate trials, two conducted at the University of 
Tel Aviv and one conducted at Stanford University.  In each trial an actual proposal used 
during some stage of the negotiations between Israel and Palestine was used to determine 
if randomly selected students would be subject to the effects of motivated reasoning.  The 
first trial focused specifically on Jewish-Israeli students, splitting these students by 
political affiliations as either “hawks” or “doves”.  While the second trial was similar to 
the first in that it split Jewish-Israeli students into hawks and doves, it also  added in 
Israeli Arab students.  The third trial, was conducted at Stanford University with 
American participants who were split into those who claimed to favor Israel and those 
who claimed to be neutral.   
 In the first trial, participants were given part of a proposal made by the Israeli 
delegation during the peace talks in Oslo.  The participants were separated into three 
groups with one group being told that this was an Israeli proposal, the second group being 
told that this was a Palestinian proposal, and the third group was given the proposal as 
being unambiguously for a two-state solution.  What the results showed was that, on 
 
3 Note: This theory was first proposed by Ross and Stillinger 
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average, when told that the proposal came from the Israelis, the participants believed that 
the proposal was fair and even for both sides.  When it was presented as a Palestinian 
proposal it was believed that the proposal favored the Palestinians.  The third part of trial 
showed evidence that the Israeli students believed that a two state solution favored the 
Palestinians, which meant this was deemed not significant to overall findings.  What the 
overall findings of this trial did show was that reactive devaluation, and therefore 
motivated reasoning, had a large effect on how proposals are perceived.  By this I mean 
that the participants believed that they were being reasonable even though their biases 
clearly had an effect on how the proposal was perceived.  A negative affective judgement 
about the other group of people caused proposals made by that group to be devalued. 
 The second trial was almost identical to the first trial, with the additions of the 
Israeli Arabs and a slight change in that the proposal that was used was one that 
Palestinian delegates presented at the Camp David talks.  The Jewish students were again 
split into hawks and doves, though the Arab students were not separated.  This second 
trial produced the same effects as the first trial for the Israeli students. What was 
interesting was that the converse reaction was true for the Arab students.  As in the first 
study, the participants were shown the proposal and asked to rate it on a scale of 1-7 with 
1 being completely in favor of Israel and 7 being completely in favor of Palestine.  When 
the proposal was presented as Palestinian it was rated, on average, as a 3.6.  The 
Palestinian students believed that it represented a fair and balanced deal for both sides.  
When it was presented as an Israeli proposal the ratings changed, averaging  between a 
rating of 2 and 3.  The proposal itself was the same.  The only thing that had changed was 
who had supposedly authored the proposal.  Both of these results lend further credence to 
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the existence of reactive devaluation.   
 The third trial was conducted in much the same way as the first two, though with 
one slight change. A third of the participants were told that the proposal was made by 
diplomats from the United States.  The participants were separated into two groups, one 
being pro-Israel and the other being considered neutral.   The findings of this trial were 
also very similar to the first two trials.  The pro-Israeli Americans believed that the 
proposal was balanced when made by Israel or by US diplomats and favored Palestinians 
when made by Palestine.  The Neutral was a little bit different in that the statistics 
showed that they believed the proposal was relatively fair and balanced4 no matter who 
had made the proposal.  The findings of each of these trials further demonstrates that 
reactive devaluation plays a major role in determining the perception of peace proposals.   
 Both Reactive Devaluation and Motivated Reason are examples of the ways in 
which affect impacts the use of reason.  Each of these phenomena points to use of the 
affective functions of the brain, and the ways in which emotions and feelings can 
influence people's ability to use the cognitive functions of reason and rationality.  Each 
also describe how people are also not likely aware of this degradation in cognitive 
functioning.  In the context of divided societies, the understanding of how affect impacts 
the use of cognitive functioning is important. If affect hinders the ability to use cognition 
effectively and also shades the awareness of this degraded capacity, then this points to the 
need for affective change.  Perhaps the most relevant example of this is the way in which 
reactive devaluation makes the prospect of coming to reasonable agreements, in these 
 
4 Note that there was slight variations with an Israeli proposal being slightly in favor of Israel and a 
Palestinian proposal being slightly in favor of Palestine.  There was a stronger belief that a proposal made by 
American diplomats was believed to be pro Palestinian.   
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divided contexts, improbable.  Must we accept that this condition is permanent or is there 
a way to encourage a change in affect in order to strive for a better cognitive capacity?   
 Both Zajonc and Haidt argue that affective judgements and attitudes are not 
susceptible to change through forms of cognitive persuasion. (Zajonc 1980)  Zajonc uses 
an example of a person who thinks that candidate A in an election is the most honest and 
therefore the best candidate.  The argument then becomes that to change this perception, 
one could provide proof that candidate A is not actually honest, or try and change the 
weight given to the value of honesty.  However, these have proven to be the least 
effective methods of changing perceptions. (Zajonc 1980) If one imagines that 
perceptions that people who are in conflict may have of one another will be similarly 
based on affective impressions, it becomes very important to understand a way to 
persuade people to change affective judgements.     
 Haidt points to the idea that the only way in which others can change affectively 
based attitudes is to use affective forms of persuasion.  Haidt does make the point that 
private reflection can have an impact on moral judgements, allowing for change, though 
he points out that this really relies on two things being present.  The first is that reasoned 
changes are likely to occur only when “the initial intuition is weak and the processing 
capacity is high.” (Haidt 2001, 819) Secondly, private reflection can also work if the 
person can understand another moral intuition and is then able to weigh the two intuitions 
against each other to see which is stronger or to decide by the conscious application of a 
rule or principle. (Haidt 2001) However, these reflections are entirely individualistic and 
are not likely to happen often.  If affective intuitions can be changed, then it is much 
more likely that it will occur with the use of affective methods.  
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 Since changing affective judgements, attitudes, and behaviors is likely to need an 
affective process, then what might be a way to effect positive change?  The answer, I 
argue, lies in affective forms of reconciliation.  The conflict resolution literature brings 
forth the idea of reconciliation being a transformative process.  This transformation, or 
the creation of new social relationships, is in fact referring to the idea of changing the 
affective moral judgements that people have made.  This speaks to an ability of being 
able to change an affective binary reaction of say “dislike” to “like”;  or possibly “mis-
trust” to “trust”.  Any number of negative impressions could conceivably be flipped to 
positive impressions.  The field of conflict resolution offers practical ways of changing 
the affect.   
 
Conflict Resolution Practices 
 In order to explore the literature on the practices of conflict resolution I have 
broken it into three sections.  First, there needs to be an understanding of what it means to 
find truth.  Secondly, building from the concepts of truth, there is a need to rebuild or 
transform social relationships. This happens through a process of restorative justice, 
generally involving the acts of apologies and reparations.  Thirdly, conflict resolution 
looks to heal the traumas that violence has caused.  “As it is defined this allows for the 
process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a 
closure of the bad relation.  This process prepares the parties for relations with justice and 
peace.” (Galtung 2011, Speech) 
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Truth and Acknowledgment 
 When a society is emerging from a violent conflict situation, the things that are 
lost are truth and sense of justice.  Truth is an 'absolute, unrenounceable value'. (Stanley 
2001)  How then can we define truth and how can it be accomplished?  “The desire to 
promote change in civil society and state mechanisms has led commissions, across the 
world, to question the nature of truth.” (Hayner 1994, 600) When the field of conflict 
resolution talks about truth though, what kind of truth is being sought?  A central 
assumption is that reconciliation requires truth-telling, though how truth-telling is defined 
is a matter in contention.  First, there is the idea that truth telling is necessary to provide 
accountability for past crimes, to heal the individual and national psyches, and to restore 
the moral consensus and order of the community. (Renner 2012) 
 In order to better define the concept of truth and the ways in which it can be 
sought, I turn to Albie Sachs.  Sachs was a judge in the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  After the commission ended in 1998, Sachs was one of the 
main author's of the report about the commissions effectiveness and impact.  For Sachs 
true reconciliation comes from “laying the foundations to be able to live together in 
country as human beings sharing certain common memories and common moral values.” 
(Sachs 1999, 1575) This involves an agreement that events occurred, acknowledgement 
of the pain these events caused, of the cruelty and violence, and the need for reparations 
of some sort.  There needs to be a sense that the entire community is now on the same 
map, so to speak. (Sachs 1999) Sachs believes that this is accomplished through a process 
of seeking the truth.  In the report, Sachs lays out the 4 typologies that he uses to define 
truth:  
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1)  Microscopic truth:  Think here of positive scientific research.  The process of 
defining a field, setting the parameters of that field, and then narrow down until you find 
an appropriate answer.  The process involves experimentation, i.e. control the variables, 
measure them and infer certain relationships.  Or think of legal enquiry where an issue is 
defined followed by a series of narrow questions.  Both of these would be microscopic 
truths. 
2) Logical Truth:  This is the truth that is implicit in a statement and doesn't require any 
further observation.  For example, “men are a fundamentally flawed species.” Therefore 
if you are a man then you are fundamentally flawed.  The flow is from general 
observation to necessary consequences of that statement being true.  Here then the goal is 
not so much finding the truth, but of findging the proof needed for the original statement.  
Here then truth is an element of proof where proof may be of more value than raw truth. 
3) Experiential Truth:  The truth that comes from the experiences of life.  These are 
phenomenological in nature.  The experimenter is a part of the field they are studying, 
examining their own relationships with others and drawing conclusions from the different 
experiences encountered in by being in this place.  This is a profound source of truth for 
the social sciences and psychology. 
4) Dialogic Truth:  This emerges from the interaction of all of the other types of truth, 
but through multiple participation, people arguing, debating with, listening to each other, 
so the truth emerges and changes, emerges and changes, never-endingly.  There is no 
single comprehensive authority of truth or final narrative about what happened.  This is 
just a process of ideas mingling with other ideas, experiences mingling with other 
experiences.  Through this process certain levels of conviction about different episodes 
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and phenomena, with many different layers, emerges.  There may be certain moments of 
closure, but even these moments of closure will become part of the commentary over 
time. This process allows for multiple narrations of the “truth” with extraordinary 
interactions between these narratives. 
 According to Stanley, the Truth commission set out to discover the truth through 
the overlapping relationships of the 4 types of truth. (Stanley 2001) Specifically, the 
workings of the TRC seemingly were based on both the subjective truth of individual 
story telling alongside the objective truth of fact-finding(microscopic) and 
debate(dialogic).  Stanley argues that this process led only to the discovery of an 
“acceptable truth”. (Stanley 2001, 528) I think the question of whether or not this 
“acceptable truth” is a just outcome must be based on the amount of people who find it 
acceptable.  It does not seem possible to find an “acceptable truth” that is indeed 
acceptable to all people.  The (TRC), like other truth commissions across the world, has 
had difficulties in accessing truth. (Hayner 1994) It seems very likely that there will be at 
least some who are not satisfied with this outcome.  The likely outcome of finding an 
acceptable truth is the maintenance of the status quo.  By this I mean that it is highly 
probable that the determination of what is acceptable is likely to be determined by those 
in power.   
 This is a problem all truth commissions will face because of the political aspect 
that goes into doing a TRC on a national level.  The desire for truth will always run into 
the barrier of political will to keep at least some parts of the real truth hidden.  The 
politics of power dictates that those who are in power maintain that power, and those who 
are not in power, seek to gain power.  This game for power and control requires people to 
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hide their own weaknesses as much as possible.  For any weakness that is exposed 
presents an opportunity for someone to use it against you.  This is not to say that truth 
commissions are not helpful to the process of reconciliation.  As Igantieff states it, truth 
Commissions can “reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in 
public discourse.” (Stanley 2001, 530) On this point Stanley argues that ultimately the 
truth uncovered by the (TRC) has promoted a more truthful future for South Africa, 
though it has ultimately left many South Africans unsatisfied. (Stanley 2001)   
 If the closet that institutions like a TRC can achieve is a sense of acceptable truth 
and that truth works to create a minimum sense at least of what stories are no longer 
acceptable, then we left with something short of the objectionable truth.  This leaves me 
with the question of what is it that individuals want out of truth?  “It therefore seems that 
people sometimes use the word ‘truth’ when what they mean is ‘judgement’. (Hegarty 
2002) Not ‘judgement’ in the formal legal sense that one gets damages for a civil wrong 
done or that someone gets sent to jail for a criminal offense, but an acknowledgement, an 
admission that what was done was wrong. (Hegarty 2002)  Many times this debate 
creates objective ‘truth’ as a pre-requisite for peace, when what is actually necessary is 
acknowledgement.  “Individuals, families, and communities may all ‘know the truth’ 
about events, but if that truth is not formally acknowledged, the sense of injustice persists 
and the possibility of the abuse occurring again remains.” (Hegarty 2002, 102) “Truth 
may be a part of the acknowledgement process, but without that acknowledgement, one 
cannot prevent the replication of the abuses of the past.” (Hegarty 2002, 102) 
 Defining truth, especially in the context of violent conflict, seems to be a very 
difficult task.  For this discussion it seems that the best way to understand truth is to think 
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of it as both the uncovering of the events that occurred and a need for acknowledgement.  
An acknowledgement of the wrongs that were committed and that these wrongs caused 
suffering.   In order for Justice to occur there needs to be some kind of acknowledgment 
by the perpetrator of the wrongs committed.  Logically this must follow from some sort 
of truth process.  A process like the TRC in South Africa allowed for the public viewing 
of this sort of acknowledgement Therefore, in this way, truth and restorative justice are 
inextricably linked. 
 It would not be difficult to imagine how alienating it would feel to know that an 
injustice has occurred but to have no one else recognize this injustice.  The 
acknowledgement of the past crimes allows for the relationships between people living in 
a community to be restored.   Restorative types of justice are one of the main goals of 
affective reconciliation.  It is the idea that the bonds of community that have been broken 
by a criminal act can be repaired and that the sense of community can be restored.  This 
is done through the process of truth telling and apologies given by the perpetrator to the 
survivors.    
 
Relationship Transformation 
 The natural progression from the idea of truth finding and the acknowledgment of 
the past is to look at apologies.  “Apologizing as a necessity for restoring a sense of 
normality in society because it is an acknowledgement of the wrongdoing that occurred.” 
(Sachs 1999, 1575) Once the past crimes have been acknowledged, there needs to be a 
process of apologizing that can bring about a better sense of justice.  Schotsmans 
describes a process like this that occurred in Sierra Leone.  “The ceremony lasts for two 
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days, with a bonfire where (survivors) and perpetrators share their experiences.  
Forgiveness is the acceptance of apologies; 'forgiveness in the heart' cannot be forced and 
comes later, according to the project staff.” (Schotsmans 2012, 282) 
 She goes on to explain how this process was used in the Moyamba District of 
Sierra Leone and that the process helped to restore a sense of community of all 
inhabitants.  Even though the former combatants had been allowed to live back in the 
communities by the survivors, and even though the survivors reported living 'peacefully' 
with the former soldiers, there was still a great lack of trust.  Through this process the ex-
combatants were able to apologize and have their apologies accepted and the survivors 
were able to receive economic support in the form of assistance with communal farming.  
In the attached note, the author acknowledges a comment by the Forum of Conscience 
that the challenge is to encourage genuine reconciliation without making people pretend 
reconciliation just in order to receive an economic benefit.   
 “Meanwhile, the best way to continue the process of 'cooling the hearts' seems to 
be creating what people are really looking for: a contained space for open dialogue on the 
past, according to traditional values of accountability and reconciliation, within a strict 
framework of space and time, and concluding with a ritual of reconciliation with the 
community and ancestors.  Although such initiatives cannot operate in isolation of the 
broader social and cultural context, they may go a long way towards promoting the goals 
of transitional justice.” (Schotsmans 2012, 287) There also, however, needs to be 
meaning created for apologies to cary any weight.   “Like most victims in Western Legal 
models, the victim is left asking, “What's in it for me?”  This is the point where... some 
restitution might do much good.  The perpetrator has to deserve being forgiven. 
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(emphasis is author's)” (Galtung 2011, Speech)  
 Ultimately what practices like public apologies and reparations do is allow for a 
change in social relationships. This is the second fundamental pillar of the idea of 
affective reconciliation.  This is also a highly debated topic in the field.  The debate 
centers around the idea of whether reconciliation is about actual repair of relationships or 
if it actually involves the transforming of prior bad relationships to more positive ones.  I 
believe that this is best stated by Spelman when she references Chayes, “She, like many 
others, thinks it important to emphasize that the kinds of repair, restoration, or 
reconstruction that constitutes coexistence are not the same set that would constitute a 
real reconciliation among formerly waring groups.” (Spelman 2003, 240) From this 
comes the question, and one that Spelman acknowledges as well, of the role of creating a 
new normative society from the ashes of the violence that had wrecked the society 
previously.  Is it better to repair the best that we can, like super gluing a broken bowl, and 
move forward accepting that the situation will just never be the same.  Or can we attempt 
to change the dynamics of the situation so that, in essence, the bowl is replaced by 
something new.   
 The difficulty that conflict resolution has had in general is in explaining this 
dynamic. What is the relationship between Reconciliation (in the sense of repairing a 
relationship that once existed) and transformation (creating a new relationship which had 
not existed in the past)?  In asking this I am not suggesting that only one can exist at a 
time, but it seems that the arguments for reconciliation are ones that want to imagine 
some level of peaceful relations between peoples before the outbreak of violence and that 
the violence itself is what broke the bonds of the relationship.  However, what if we were 
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to look at the situation with the idea that maybe a peaceful relationship was never in place 
even before the violence.  What if the expressed violence was based upon the past 
negative relationships.  In this case it would not due to return to the past relationships.  I 
think this idea of reconciliation, as repairing past relationships, falls under the same 
fallacies as the idea of peace being the time and events that occur between epochs of 
latent violence.  If this all has some truth to it, then we must understand the difference 
between creating a new relationship structure in post-violent communities, and the idea 
of reconciliation as stated.   
 I return to Spelman here when she says that “And yet repair is also presumptuous 
in its insistence that a given point in the history of something or a given point n history is 
more important than any other point or condition.” (Spelman 2003, 241)  Meanwhile, 
Llewellyn argues that the idea of restoring relationships should not be understood as a 
restoration of the past relationship.  Instead she argues that “the aim is to 'restore' 
relationships between and among peoples the parties involved to a state in which all 
parties are treated with equal concern, respect, and dignity.” (Llewellyn and Philpott 
2014, 10) In this sense it is the restoration of relationships to an ideal of what a right 
relationship should be.  If viewed in this light “restore” really means a transformation to a 
relationship that is more just, equal, and fair.  This transformation of relationship can be 
seen then as a movement toward something that is positive and away from the negative 
aspects of the previous relationship.  
 
Healing Trauma 
 All of these restorative practices work towards the healing of the individual 
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traumas that have been experienced during the violence.  It is the healing of this trauma 
that allows for the possibility that the underlying affect can change.  The healing of 
trauma is a major part of the affective process of reconciliation. This healing could allow 
people to be able to move forward from the traumatic experience of violence.  Notice that 
this is not saying that people should just move on and forget the past experiences.  The 
forgetting of past events is not the same as healing the trauma.  In fact healing entails the 
need to remember the past events, and for people to have what happened be 
acknowledged by others.  This healing would allow for both the past to be remembered 
and for a more positive foundation to move forward.     
 While this is a very effective process for an individual the challenge has been how 
to translate this effect to a larger community of people.  There is also the problem of how 
to get all of the people who have been effected by violence together individually if the 
violence was on a larger, national scale.  The logistics of being able to get all of the 
people together can be prohibitive at times.  Thus more people have turned to process on 
the more macro scale.   
 The healing of trauma on this more macro scale generally involves attempts at 
having survivors speak at commissions that have been put together, like the one in South 
Africa.  It is believed that the public nature of these commissions can be a better platform 
for healing.  The argument for this possibly best put forth by Michael Humphrey and is 
based on the idea that speaking out helps survivors get over their traumas and is a 
cathartic process for the perpetrators.” (Renner 2012, 56) There are also calls for a 
process such as this to be able to reach the type of historical truth that was talked about in 
the truth section.  The subsequent general truth telling is argued to have a great healing 
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effect.  “Healing and reconciliation in violent ethnic and religious conflicts depends on a 
process of transactional contrition and forgiveness between aggressors and victims which 
is indispensable to the establishment of a new relationship based on mutual acceptance 
and reasonable trust.  This process depends on joint analysis of the history of the conflict, 
recognition of injustices and resulting historic wounds, and acceptance of moral 
responsibility where due.” (Fisher 1999, 28) 
 The challenge is that healing can occur on a collective scale, and there is certainly 
benefits for this, but that having this as the only vehicle for healing can leave people 
feeling alienated.  The argument here is that healing needs to occur on both the individual 
and on the communal and national, with a balance between these three levels.  Batchelor 
argues that the process should be more national. “On the contrary, some kind of 
collective, national transitional justice process is necessary for the reduction of the effects 
of trauma on individuals, given the fact that, as Sumerfield states, trauma '...is not a 
private experience and the suffering it engenders is resolved in a social context'.” 
(Batchelor 2012, 327) Though in the study conducted by Catherine Byrnes she 
discovered that individuals who had participated in the TRC reported feeling alienated 
after the process was over. (Byrnes 2004) These same people reported that they wished to 
have been able to have had an apology directly from the person and not just an account of 
the truth.  This leaves the debate quite open as to how best to proceed, though I would 
argue that both are needed. 
 It is a combination of the actions described above that can have the most effect on 
healing.  The search for the truth and the acknowledgement of wrongs, plays perhaps the 
greatest role in this process.  In many cases involving past violence people may not know 
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where the bodies of loved ones have been buried.  Being able to find the truth about 
where a body has been buried or learning the truth about the circumstances of how the 
person died can have an extremely positive effect on a person.  This can lead in some 
cases to being able to accept the apology from the person who committed the crime, 
though this step is not always guaranteed.  In this way though, truth, acknowledgment 
and apologies can act in accordance to help the healing of trauma.   
 
Forgiveness 
 The healing of trauma allows for one final step of affective reconciliation: the 
ability of people to forgive the acts that have been done against them.  This is generally a 
step that tends to get over looked because, of all of the different aspects of affective 
reconciliation, forgiveness is the most personal.  Forgiveness is not something that can be 
accounted for in peace agreements and is not something that even a community should be 
able to require. Forgiveness is as absolute and as non cognitive as the act of violence that 
it aims to resolve.  Forgiveness is immutable, trans-indentive, and non-cognitive in nature, 
and therefore not able to be understood cognitively.  This lack of human cognition of 
forgiveness should not in any way mute the effect that forgiveness can have on the 
individual. We understand it then as separate from the concrete and measurable aspects of 
reconciliation such as trials and reparations.    
 Forgiveness represents absolutism in the same way that violence represents 
absolutism.  I speak of forgiveness in the terms that it represents for an individual.  The 
singularity of being able to disassociate themselves from the negative emotions that 
surrounded the event.  The act of forgiveness is then itself completely symbolic in nature, 
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representing this moment for the individual.  Forgiveness represents the finite as much as 
a violent represents a finite event.  To perhaps make it a bit clearer, violence acts are 
things that cannot be undone.  Once a violent act has been committed it cannot be undone 
or changed.  For most survivors it represents a landmark in their lives.  Forgiveness is the 
very personal choice of letting go of the emotions that surround that event.  In essence, 
this is not an act of changing the event itself, it is an act of changing the impact that this 
event has had on an individual.  This clearly can only be done by the individual and only 
for that individual.  What forgiveness does represent is the personal decision to move on 
from the negative emotions.  I believe that in this way it represents the ultimate form of 
changing negative affect, and because of this, needs to be understood as a necessary 
element of affective reconciliation.  
 
Affective Reconciliation 
 This chapter has focused on the foundations for how the field of conflict 
resolution perceive the phenomena of reconciliation.  I have labeled this idea as affective 
reconciliation.  After exploring the concepts in this section I believe that it is fair to say 
that motivated reasoning, reactive devaluation, and cultural cognition all represent 
mechanisms used for the defense of moral judgements.   
 Based upon the social psychology research on the primacy of affect and the 
subsequent processes that follow, it is clear that initial judgements, generally influenced 
by group association and culture, are responsible for influencing how individuals 
interpret initial stimuli.  These processes lead to conditions like motivated reasoning, 
cultural cognition, and reactive devaluation, which are the foundations for the naive 
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realism.  These are all mechanisms that people use to protect that initial affective 
judgement.  If these mechanisms are not susceptible to cognitive persuasion in cases like 
which restaurant to eat at or what your favorite color is, how much more are they going to 
be impervious to reason and rationality in situations where people don't like each other 
and they have experienced violence at the hands of the other peoples.  In these cases of 
violent conflict, it is the underlying affect that must be addressed and changed.   
 Conflict Resolution practice offers this precisely.  It is the ability to heal the 
trauma and to change the relationships that can lead to a change in the affect.  I postulate 
here that when conflict resolutionists talk about the idea of affective reconciliation, it is 
really the idea that truth, justice, apologies and forgiveness really have the ability to 
change how people affectively react. That is, it is affective response from a negative to a 
positive.  Since the affective response is binary, affective reconciliation pertains to have 
the ability to change a dislike to a like, or a not-trust to a trust, response. By changing this 
initial response to stimuli it follows that there would also be a change in the moral 
judgements that people make.   
 What the research in this chapter has shown is the tendency of people to make 
affective judgments and then to use reason as a way of justifying these judgements.  
These judgements provide the foundation for the cognitive beliefs that influence the way 
people make decisions.  Moral judgments are based upon the intuitive, affective 
responses to stimuli.  These judgments then influence the ways that people are able to use 
reason in certain contexts.  Specifically in the perception of facts and in the perception of 
fair agreements.  Thus, even the cognitive agreements that might be reached, can be 
undermined by the presence of a negatively valenced affect.  If reactive devaluation and 
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motivated reasoning are the phenomenological byproducts of underlying affective moral 
judgements, then it follows that a change in the initial affective response would also 
cause a change in the overall sequence.  A change in this sequence could ultimately lead 
to a greater possibility of reaching cognitive agreements and a higher likelihood that 
those agreements would be followed.  This points to the need to integrate cognitive and 
affective reconciliation processes into an integrated model.    
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CHAPTER IV 
STRUCTURE AND SUBSTANCE: TEMPORAL LEVELS OF COGNITIVE AND 
AFFECTIVE RECONCILIATION 
 
 
 So long as human beings possess the capacity for violence there will be a threat of 
violence.  The fear that this threat creates is, I believe, the ultimate cause for the 
continuation of violent cycles.  The reality of human beings capacity for violence may be 
inescapable, though not hopeless.  I argue that the answer to preventing the continuation 
of violent cycles lies in the ability of human societies to assuage this fear of violence thus 
in so doing ameliorating the need for violence. 
 I argue that for this type of society to be created, human beings must be able to 
reconcile themselves with the social world in which they exist.  In this I mirror Hegel's 
take on reconciliation and I find his view important in several ways.  First, is his 
definition of Reconciliation which is the German word “Versohnung”.  This 
interpretation is very specific to the idea of a positive form of reconciliation in which 
people opt into society because they have been able to reconcile with that society.  
Secondly, he believes that this a part of a well ordered society.  Third, he talks about 
reconciliation as a way to make society be like a home.  The analogy of a home is very 
important for the distinction between cognitive structuring of society and a way to 
substantiate that structure.   
 I will argue here in this chapter that there are two things which are needed in order 
for the building of a peaceful society to be successful.  There needs to be a structure built 
that can allow for people to live in coexistence and there needs to be the substance of 
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social bonds that will sustain that structure.  The structure needs to be right and 
reasonable for all members of the society.  For that structure to be right and reasonable, 
cognitive agreements need to reached.  For the substantive element of society to exist, the 
people living within that structure will need to have a positive relationship with people 
who are a part of a different group.  The structure needs to be built upon agreements 
between these groups.  The relationships that support this structure need to build on a 
fundamental level of trust and cooperation.  
 Further, I want to demonstrate in this chapter is that there needs to be another 
layer of theory added to the political philosophy that has dominated the contemporary 
discussion on the building of peaceful societies.  The additional layer begins with the 
understanding of reconciliation as two distinct forms, the cognitive and affective.  If 
taken as two separate expressions of reconciliation then we can better understand how 
each can be used most effectively.  … the best for defining the expectations and 
limitations of both types.  Perhaps the best way to look at reconciliation is as a means of 
incorporating all forms of reconciliation into a societal structure that would allow for 
people within that society to choose what best suits their needs.  This is understandably 
vague.  My point here is that reconciliation simply needs to be adopted as the goal of 
society, and that can take the form best suited to that societies needs.  In this sense, there 
will need to be as much effort put into affective forms of reconciliation as there is into 
cognitive forms.   That for the creation of a peaceful society, cognitive agreements need 
to take into account affective motivations, and that affective forms of reconciliation need 
to build cooperation towards a goal of fair and just structures.   
 The layers of reconciliation I believe work in this way: Cognitive reconciliation, 
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the ability to accept another persons' or groups' claims on what Habermas would call “the 
good life” are in fact based upon a reasonable foundation, is instrumental in the creation 
of social cooperation.  This step, however, represents an upper layer of society building.  
This is because the ability to to accept these claims of reasonableness through the use of 
rationality are many times obscured by the presence of negative affect.   The layer of 
rationality and reasonableness are built upon a layer of affect and emotion.  If the affect 
feelings are negative, then this is likely to have a negative influence on the ability to use 
reason.  Violent conflict between peoples almost certainly produces a negative affect 
response.  Therefore, The ability to reach rational consensus and an acceptance on 
reasonableness is linked to the ability of society to heal the traumatic wounds of violence.   
 In Chapter II we explored the cognitive forms of reconciliation through several 
theories of political philosophy.  The current direction of peacebuilding represents a 
reflection of these theories, and the more cognitive philosophies in general.  Rawls 
conceptualizes what it would take to create a pluralistic society, this being the need for 
am agreed upon conception of political justice that would allow for different 
comprehensive doctrines to coexist in a society.  His theory though is based upon an 
assumed level of social cooperation, something that his theory does not explain how to 
create.  In an attempt to solve this problem I looked to the theories of Habermas, which 
aim at the creation of social cooperation.  The theory of discourse describes how 
communicative action can lead to creation of societal goals, though does not discuss how 
this would world work in the context of divided societies.  To answer this we looked at 
Dryzek, who has applied Habermas' theories specifically to the contexts of divided 
societies.  What we discovered in Dryzek are the challenges and pitfalls that deliberative 
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democracy faces in these types of situations. The foundational argument is that rationality 
is what provides the human beings the ability to come to fair agreements. It is these 
agreements that provide the platform for people to reconcile their differing conceptions.  
Reason and rationality are the cognitive functions of the brain, hence why I am 
describing this as cognitive reconciliation.     
 In chapter III we looked at a different perspective of the ways in which affective 
intuitions can cloud the ability to use reason.  As demonstrated by the research done in 
chapter III, the underlying affect plays a major role in determining whether or not people 
will be able to utilize reason and rationality.  By looking at social psychology, the chapter 
established a way of understanding this phenomena. This process can be described as 
moving from affective intuitions to the creation of moral judgements.  These moral 
judgements then further lead to phenomena such as motivated reasoning, reactive 
devaluation, and naive realism.  We also examined the practice of conflict resolution, 
exploring the ways that in which truth, justice, apologies and forgiveness work to heal 
trauma and transform social relationships.  When combined with the discussion of 
affective judgement, what was discovered is that when talking about transformation, 
conflict resolutionists are describing the process of changing a negative affect into a 
positive one.    This will represented as the substance of building a peaceful society.   
 What we have explored in the previous two chapters are two perspectives on the 
question of how to build peaceful, stable societies.  Social psychology does provide a 
counterpoint to political philosophy and suggests some challenges in the theories.  
Political philosophers like Rawls and Habermas's argues for a conception of society that 
is based upon the idea of public reason.  Social psychological research demonstrates that 
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there is a large component of affective moral judgements involved in the ability of people 
to reason.  This seemingly puts these two at odds with each other.   However, what I 
believe that conflict resolution practices can actually fill in much of this gap between 
psychology and political theory.  I would thus like to conceptualize a new model of how 
to combine the affective forms of reconciliation along with the more cognitive forms of 
creating political reconciliation.  This new model represents a way of understanding how 
cognitive and affect can work in tandem as well as describing a progression towards a 
state of reconciliation. 
 This model really starts though with where most peace processes begin, which the 
signing of a peace agreement.  These peace agreements are necessary to bring the 
violence to a halt, but do not represent cognitive reconciliation.  The state that is created 
by these initial agreements falls much closer to a political state of a modus vivendi, or a 
power sharing stalemate.  I conceptualize this as meaning that the initial cognitive peace 
agreements need to create a balance of power and freezes the situation in a place of 
temporary stability.  This is a necessary step in the peace process, but represents, alone, 
an unsustainable peace.  Being locked into power sharing tends to reinforce divisions 
within a society.  It is these divisions that are likely to lead societies back to violent 
conflict.  Even though there is some agreement of this among political theorists and 
conflict resolutionists alike, the way in which to move beyond this situation is a place of 
contention.  Rawls specifically states that his theory is attempting to move beyond a 
modus vivendi and I believe that Habermas would agree that his theory is a step beyond 
this as well.  While conflict resolution argue for the more affective measures.  This model 
represents an attempt to incorporate both the affect and cognitive into one model, 
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demonstrating the ways in which the two can work cooperatively. 
 What Rawls' theory, and to a large extent Habermas' as well, attempt to 
demonstrate is a way of moving past a modus vivendi through the creation of just 
political systems.  The creation of these cognitive agreements is fraught with difficulties 
because of the ways that negative affective feelings can inhibit people's capacity to use 
reason.  As demonstrated by Zajonc, affective judgement is the first to occur, followed by 
cognitive judgment.  It is this initial affective judgement that is most difficult to change.  
This means that the first way in which human beings judge a situation is through affect.  
Nesbitt and Wilson argue that there is likely a high degree of influence from a persons 
cultural background on these affective processes.  Also according the Zajonc, these 
affective judgements tend to stay the longest are the most difficult to change.  It is quite 
possibly that Rawls' would find agreement with Zajonc, Nesbitt and Wilson.  I believe 
that an argument can be made that this process is quite similar to Rawls' conception of 
comprehensive doctrines.  Rawls is not also not looking to necessarily change any 
groups' comprehensive doctrine,5 as long as what is practiced in public follows the 
reasonable agreement on justice.  What Rawls argues for is a system that would allow for 
people with essentially differing affective moral judgements to coexist.  This then is not 
necessarily a tension point.   
 What may prove to be a tension point is the idea that affective judgements lead to 
motivated reasoning.  As Kahan points out in his study, people generally perceive 
themselves as being rational when in fact their perceptions of rationality are influenced 
by affect.  Here is the first tension between the psychology and political theory.  If Rawls 
 
5 Note: Granted that there certainly could be private practices that society could outlaw entirely. 
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depends on the ability of people being able to come to reasonable agreements, then 
affective motivated reasoning will make this difficult. The theory of motivated reasoning 
states that people's ability to use reason is effected by their affective judgements. I 
believe that this is likely the thing that Rawls attempts to get away from with the use of 
the original position and the veil of ignorance.   Though the ability to have a mechanism 
like the veil of ignorance in a real life context is very much debatable.   
 A second tension point involves Habermas' theory and reactive devaluation.  
Habermas pushes the idea that communicative action will lead to the creation of social 
cooperation.  Habermas may be right when he discusses the way in which communicative 
action leads to the building of social goals which would necessitate social cooperation to 
accomplish.  What his theory does not take into account is the problem of motivation.  If 
people lack the motivation to want to work with people whom are viewed as adversaries, 
I do not believe that rational discourse will be able to overcome this problem.  This is 
demonstrated in the studies done be Moaz, highlighted in Chapter III.  These findings 
show that the determination on the reasonableness of a proposal will be influenced by the 
affective feelings that a person has towards their own group and the other group. So when 
people are presented with might otherwise be reasonable proposals made during a 
negotiation, the perception change depending on its source.   
 In the Moaz study, the proposals that were given to the respondents were ones that 
had already been agreed upon in negotiations between representatives of Israel and 
Palestine.  So what is lacking is not an element of reasonableness of the proposal.  This 
then points not to a problem of reasonable agreements or of rational discussions, but one 
of affective judgements shading perceptions.  These feelings of fear and that the other 
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side is untrustworthy leads to diminished capacity to see reason.  These are the types of 
affective judgements that Zajonc and Haidt point to.  These affective judgements are not 
likely to change through a process of rational discourse, they are more likely to inhibit 
rational discourse.  There may be, as Rawls suggests, some trustees or representatives 
that could, in essence, not be effected by the emotions and would therefore be able to 
reach agreements.  Though these trustees will still face the challenges of reactive 
devaluation when the proposal is presented to the group as a whole.6   In other words, 
people will have to want to opt into any of the reasonable agreements that are produced 
by a Rawlsian mechanism.      
 Thus cognitive agreements can conceivably only be effective if the affective 
motivation is present to both reach an agreement and enough positive motivation exists 
for people to follow the agreement afterwards.  War weariness or a lack of desire to keep 
fighting may in fact represent enough of an affective motivation to sign peace agreements, 
though I would argue that this 'feeling' is inherently negative and unlikely to be enough 
motivation to sustain an agreement over the long term.  Thus if we speak of post-
agreement time periods, it is necessary that some sort of positive affective change will 
need to be introduced to maintain the motivation necessary for sustainability.  Without 
positive affective motivation, any adherence to an agreement becomes coercive, likely 
even beyond the amount of coercion that political theorists would deem to be positive.   
 It is not my goal to discredit the theories of Habermas, Rawls, or Dryzek with this 
discussion.  Nor is it my goal to argue against the use of a cognitive processes of 
 
6 Note: I Concede here that a possible solution would be to make sure that upon presenting the proposal, 
the trustee would need to make sure to clarify that this was their sides proposal.  This may work as an 
effective strategy. 
 82 
reconciliation.  It is my goal to demonstrate that it is necessary to add more layers to the 
theories, at least in the context of societies transitioning out of violent situations.   The 
political theories rely on the assumption of an existent level of social cohesion or believe 
that the process of cognitive agreement making will be able to build the necessary social 
cooperation.  What has been shown is that affect impacts people's ability to use reason 
and be rational.  
 What the field of conflict resolution shows is that it can be possible to transform 
the underlying affective.   This is through the affective forms of reconciliation through 
processes of truth, justice, trauma healing and community building.  The goal of affective 
reconciliation is to transform the negative affect to positive, changing the way that the 
people living in society judge the other groups living in that society.  I propose that with 
affective reconciliation we can fill in the gap between psychology and political theory.  
Conceivably, the transformation of affective judgement could lead to a change in the 
processes of moral reasoning and reactive devaluation.  These changes in the affect  
would also conceivably lead to an increased ability to have rational discourse and to 
reach reasonable agreements.  This would allow for people to opt into pluralistic societies, 
thus allowing for the reconciliation of society as a whole.  Even if this process wouldn't 
assure that every single citizen would ultimately be reconciled, it would ensure that 
enough people would be to make the cognitive structures meaningful.  This would allow 
for stability and sustainability over generations, which, I believe, is ultimately the goal of 
all three fields discussed in this thesis. 
 Even having overarching goals, as Habermas suggests, that build social 
cooperation only allow for the cooperation for as long as the goals remain present.  Once 
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the goals are gone, the reason for social cooperation goes as well.  What affective 
reconciliation offers is the ability to create the social cooperation where it was lacking 
before.  Bonds that are built between people on an affective level are not reliant on the 
existence of existential goals or threats.  The transformation of relationships, the flipping 
of the underlying affective reactive system, would allow for the type of social cohesion 
that would also allow for the cognitive political structures to be able to be sustained.  To 
show this, let's take a look again at the arguments through Dryzek. 
 Dryzek in his work attempts to describe a process of pulling people into a 
cognitive state and away from negative feelings.  To make this point he uses an example 
of  “a harrowing story of (say) rape and murder in a Bosnian village can be told in terms 
of guilt of one ethnic group and violated innocence of another-fuel for revenge. But the 
story can also be told in terms of violation of basic principles of humanity that apply to 
all ethnicities, making reconciliation at least conceivable (though not easy).” (Dryzek 
2005, 223) This is an example of cognitive reconciliation and how it cannot deal with the 
emotions of guilt and revenge.  Having survivors, who lived through the experience, try 
and take a step out of their context and into the realm of cognitive abstraction, seems to 
be a.   
 What would it matter to a survivor of rape that it the action violates all basic 
principles of humanity?  That person would not need to even comprehend that kind of 
abstraction, they have lived through it.  Even if it was able to be accomplished, why 
would the survivor of rape want to change their narrative?  I posit here that what the 
survivor needs is to helped with the trauma of the event.  Reconciliation in this instance 
will not come about by changing the narrative of the people involved to help facilitate 
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better political deliberation.  Dryzek's assertion could possibly work temporarily to allow 
for an agreement to be reached.  However, the trauma of the event will not just go away 
because the person has abstracted out to the rights of humanity.  The person will still 
experience the trauma of the event even if an agreement is reached that is rational and 
reasonable.  It is this trauma that will need to be healed if it is ever likely that the 
agreements will be sustainable of over time.   I argue that it is fact the change in affect 
that will lead to the ability for people see each other as human, which would lead to the 
ability to have reasoned discourse. 
 I argue that there must exist an element of accepting each other's humanity before 
we can accept the validity of another person's values and beliefs.  If the perception exists 
that another group means to do harm, then there is little ground for accepting the others' 
claims as also being reasonable.  This would suggest then, a change is needed, though not 
in the capacity for reasonableness and reciprocity, but in the willingness to do so.  
Therefore, the creation of the trust to accept that the other is acting with fairness, is a pre-
condition for the presence of the types of reconciliation that Dryzek is arguing for.  If the 
perceptions of the other are still tied into the violent events that occurred in the past, it 
seems unlikely that there would be an impetus to change those perceptions of mistrust 
and fear.  The trauma of the past must then be accounted for in order for cognitive 
reconciliation to be possible.   
 Trauma healing only represents one aspect of this work though.  The relationship 
between survivor and perpetrator, and more abstractly between each of these people and 
the community as a whole, needs to be repaired where a previous relationship existed, or 
transformed where no positive relationship was present in the past.  Only then can the 
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cognitive structures be able to have the desired effect of building stability over 
generations.  In other words, what is needed in order to make the political theories work 
is for the building of the type of social relationships that the field of conflict resolution 
discusses.  Transforming the social relationships is the step necessary for the political 
theories to make sense.    
 Taking into account theses discussions, I believe that there needs to be a better 
understanding of how to incorporate cognitive and affect theories and practices into a 
more coherent model of reconciliation. Cognitive reconciliation works in situations 
where a sufficient level of social stability has already been attained. Situations where the 
memories and trauma of recent violence are not still having an impact on the human 
psyche.  Situations where the negative affective judgements are not clouding perceptions 
of reason and rationality.  However, the first step in this process is, in fact, a cognitive 
agreement to cease hostilities.  The peace agreements generally create a state of modus 
vivendi, bringing about the situation of frozen hostilities.  There needs to be a way to 
move past this state.  A way that involves the use of affect that leads to the ability for 
cognitive reconciliation to take place.   
 Viewed in this way, the model essential works as a progression from cognitive 
agreement, to the use of affective reconciliation techniques, which subsequently allows 
for the creation of better cognitive agreements.  The political theories work to push 
society to attain very high levels of justice.  These levels of political justice rely on a 
sustainable level of social cooperation to work.  A more sustainable social cooperation 
requires a higher threshold of social cohesion.  This level of social cohesion is attainable 
when the positive affective motivation exists to create it.  A new social cohesion is 
 86 
possible when people are able to transform the negative relationships of the past into 
positive relationships.  A transformation on a social, affective, level will therefore enable 
the types of cognitive discussions that lead to reasonable agreements.  This creates a 
generalizable three stage process to transition out of violence (Table 1).  The first step is 
the signing of peace agreements, which allows for the stability to do affective forms of 
reconciliation, which then allows for the more complex form of political justice to 
become possible.    
 
Table 1. Stages in the model 
Stage 1: 
          -  Peace Agreements are Signed 
• These agreements create situations where powers are balanced and 
governments can start to take effect on society. 
Stage 2: 
        -  Affective Reconciliation Measures is begun 
• This would include the strategies of Truth, Justice, Trauma 
Healing, and Relationship building.  These would focus on 
building trust and social cohesion. 
Stage 3: 
        -  Creation of more Politically Just Institutions 
• These types of agreements become possible when the affect has 
changed and there are greater levels of trust and social cohesion.  
This stage represents cognitive reconciliation. 
 
 
Scale of Reconciliation 
 I believe that the above table is useful for looking at a theoretical foundation for 
the model and that it would also be a useful exercise to look at several cases of 
transitioning societies to see where they might be in the process.  Therefore I would like 
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to create a sale of cognitive and affective reconciliation.  By placing countries along this 
scale I will show whether those countries are trending towards affective or cognitive 
forms of reconciliation.  I have chosen 5 countries that all started the process with either 
peace agreements between the groups in conflict or with specific agreements to form 
power sharing governments (Table 2).  For the sake of this argument I am going to be 
treating those two as similar enough starting points.   
 
Table 2. Model Stages with Countries 
 Cognitive Strategies Affective Strategies 
Stage 1:  
• Yemen 
 
• Northern Ireland     
                      
 
 
Stage 2:  
 
 
 
 
• Rwanda 
• South Africa 
• Sierra Leone 
 
Stage 3:  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 In the discussion below I will provide a brief description of the current situation in 
South Africa, Yemen, and Rwanda. I will also demonstrate why I believe each of these 
three plus Sierra Leone and Norther Ireland, deserve the spots I have given them.  Both 
Northern Ireland and Yemen have attempted to approach their transitions through a 
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process of reaching more political agreements and neither have enacted many affective 
strategies.  Rwanda, South Africa, and Sierra Leone have all used affective means of 
reconciliation in attempts to create social cohesion.   
 
Rwanda 
 A 4 decade long struggle between the ethnic Hutu majority and Tutsi minority 
culminated in one of the worst genocides that has ever occurred in human history.  From 
April 7 until July 17, a span of 100 days, over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
massacred by the more radicalized factions of Hutus.  The genocide ended only when the 
rebel Tutsi militia, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, was able to fight their way into 
the capital city of Kigali.  This in turn lead one of the largest refugee migrations, as over 
2 million hutu refugees left Rwanda to neighboring countries, including a staggering 
800,000 that entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the span of 4 days.  
Rwanda is an extremely densely populated country meaning that many of the people who 
carried out the genocidal acts live in the same villages as the survivors.  This has lead 
Rwanda to carry out a tradition form of local justice known as the Gacaca courts in an 
attempt to restore the relationships between perpetrators and survivors and allow for 
communal reintegration.   
 Rwanda, though, is in a very precarious place politically, with no formal 
agreement between Hutu's and Tutsi's on the formation of a government or how that 
should look.  Rwandan politics is very much a one party system, with the political 
opposition to Paul Kagame and his party being ruthlessly oppressed.  This suppression of 
political dissent stretches to even the moderate Tutsi controlled politicians and political 
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parties.  There is an election scheduled for 2017 with Kagame saying that he will not seek 
to be elected for a third term.  With the amount of political suppression that has occurred 
over the last 15-20 years in Rwanda this new election is likely to result in a high margin 
of victory for whichever party leader replaces Kagame in the party structure.  This all 
stems from the way in which the Genocide in 1994 ended, with Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
a Tutsi militia, moved into the capital city of Kigali.  No official peace agreement was 
ever signed between Hutu and Tutsi representatives.  Though the Genocide makes 
Rwanda a special case, the lack of political agreement is worrying. 
 What is perhaps more worrying is that it is currently illegal in Rwanda to state 
that all of the government's top leadership is of Tutsi origins as it is now illegal to public 
distinguish between Hutu and Tutsi.  While this policy certainly has legitimate 
foundations, it also serves the more malignant political purpose of not being to talk about 
this power imbalance in public. The political problems in Rwanda have, at least since the 
middle of the 20th century, always revolved around the exclusion of opposition voices in 
the government.  My fear is that if this continues it will eventually lead to the same types 
of issues that lead to the 1994 genocide.  For this reason I believe that Rwanda is very 
close to the extreme affective part of the scale and demonstrates some of the dangers that 
can occur when reasonable cognitive reconciliation has not occurred.   
 
South Africa 
 Ended the period of forced racial segregation and political oppression known as 
Apartheid with the first open and free election in the countries history in 1994.  Apartheid 
had been in place for nearly 50 years (though racial oppression had gone on for much 
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longer), causing great injustice for the black majority by the white minority.  There was a 
great amount of violence committed in the time period as well, as brutal police tactics 
were needed to keep the repressive system in place.  These acts of violence routinely lead 
to the deaths of anyone that was deemed as subversive.  When Apartheid ended it was 
decided that the rifts that existed between the different communities should be mended.  
This lead to the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was 
established in an attempt to heal the collective trauma that the violence and oppression 
had caused.  The TRC played a large role in deterring the types of retaliatory violence 
that had been seen in other post colonial countries.    
 South Africa attempted to perform affective Reconciliation on a national level, 
focusing on inter-community reconciliation, to mixed results.  The TRC sought to 
exchange the truth about past political crimes for amnesty from prosecution,  It was 
hoped that by bringing the past crimes out into the open, that forgiveness and healing 
could occur.  The TRC was successful at bringing much of the truth about these crimes, 
but the general effect and whether it was in fact able to bring about community healing, is 
highly debatable.  Many participants report feelings of alienation from the process and 
that there was a perceived lack of justice for the criminals.  Others report that the TRC 
offered the entire nation of South Africa a collective moment of being able to heal from 
the past.  Thus,  I believe that the TRC was able to provide a more macro level of 
affective reconciliation, it was not able to achieve the inter-personal levels that very 
important for the transforming of social relationships.   
 Unfortunately, South Africa also currently has massive political problems which 
stem from the abuses and corruption that rampant at the top echelons of the government. 
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(Insert what the problems are here) People have reported feeling that conditions are 
worse now for a majority of black South Africans than they were under Apartheid.  This 
stems from figures like 40% unemployment and shanty towns that have doubled in size 
since 1994.  The root cause of this, I believe, is that South Africa has remained under one 
party rule, the ANC, since 1994.  With little opposition power, there has been no 
mechanism to check the power of the ANC.  This has allowed for high levels of political 
corruption and cronyism.  This is unfortunately why I leave South Africa towards the 
affect side of the scale. 
 
Yemen 
 Yemen has followed a succession of cycles of political agreements followed by 
violence.  This started in 1972, when what was the People's Republic of Yemen (south 
Yemen) and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) fought the first war against each 
other.  The cycle of violence between the two countries continued until 1990 when the 
two agreed to form a single country.  The agreement to form a new nation came wit.. a 
new government with a parliament, President and Vice-president.   It was further agreed 
that the leader of North Yemen would be the first President while the leader of South 
Yemen would be the first Vice-President.  However, this political agreement would last 
only 4 years, and on February 20, 1994 a new civil war started between North and South.  
In 1999, a new constitution was signed and new elections took place with Ali Abdallah 
Saleh winning the presidency.   
 Saleh is from South Yemen and was the original president of the Yemen Arab 
Republic.  Saelh presidency lasted from 1999 until 2012 when he was forced to turn 
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power over to his vice president.  Saleh's term in office saw the rise of a group known as 
the Houthis, named after the cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi.  Al-Houthi had started 
protesting the treatment of people from North Yemen by government forces claiming that 
there were high levels of discrimination.  Saleh was forced from office  after protests 
began when it was learned that he planned on changing the constitution and stay in power 
until he could hand over the government to his son.  Saleh's Vice-president Abd Rabbuh 
Monsur Hadi took office after a special election in February 2012. 
 Violence only escalated further after Hadi took office and this lead to the creation 
of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC).  This was aimed at being a transitional 
justice conference with the hopes of creating an agreement that would stabalize the 
situation.  The talks were conducted by the UN with the initial backing of both the 
Houthis and Salafis. The conference had started in March 2013 with the goal of reaching 
an agreement after 6 months.  However, the NDC was unable to come to reach consensus 
on the question of what to do about Southern Yemen separatists, and so the conference 
was extended until January 2014.  During this time two different Houthi representatives 
were assassinated in the capitol city of Sana'a, leading to the Houthi delegation 
withdrawing from the talks.  The NDC produced a final agreement, without the presence 
of the Houthis, calling for an evenly split power sharing government.  This agreement 
was rejected not only by the Houthis, leading to the forceful taking of Sana'a by Houthis 
fighters in Spetember 2014.    
 What seems clear in this case is that any sort of social cohesion between the 
Houthis in the North and the Salafis in the South is completely lacking.  Though many 
agreements have been reached, none of them thus far have been able to prevent the two 
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sides from warring with each other.   It seems that what is lacking the this context is the 
affective motivation from both sides to make an agreement happen.  As the tension has 
grown, the two sides seem to be getting further apart, a new civil war seems likely.  
Without any work towards the building of social cohesion or affective change, it seems 
unlikely that any of the agreements reached on the political structure of Yemen will be 
effective.  It is for this reason that I have place Yemen at the far cognitive side of the 
scale. 
 
Direction for Future Research 
 
 I think that this project has raised some more questions for me than I can ever 
hope to answer in a project of this scope. These new questions I hope can become paths 
for future research.  These are some of the questions that I have come up with: 
 
• The first of these is about the time frame between initial peace agreement and the 
creation of the affective measures of reconciliation.  Also, what are the effects of 
a modus vivensi on the affective reconciliation process?  How can power sharing 
governments be persuaded to allow affective reconciliation to take place? Would 
this answer be different for the macro affective measures and the micro measures? 
 
• The Second question is how best to understand the actual interplay between 
cognitive structures, which are more concrete by necessity, and the role of affect 
which is more fluid by necessity. 
 
• Thirdly, How do we account for the long process that this model could represent.  
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How long can the modus vivendi governments remain functional?  How long until 
they become dysfunctional and start to become a hinderance to the affective 
process? 
 
 If there is one conclusion that my research has brought me to, it is this.  What we 
need is to have cognitive solutions to cognitive problems and we need to have affective 
solutions to affective problems.  We should not expect cognitive structures to heal the 
wounds of trauma nor should we expect that a focus on transforming relationships would 
be enough to construct the reasonable and rational structures that societies need in order 
to function properly.  A focus on cognitive reconciliation alone would not allow for the 
creation of the affective motivations necessary to make the agreements sustainable.  A 
focus on affective reconciliation alone leaves open the possibility of poor governmental 
structures which may fail to overcome the legitimate differing conceptions of society that 
people have.  Therefore, I conclude that both represent individually necessary and not 
sufficient conditions for the transition from violence to a peaceful society. 
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